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A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF THE
INITIATIVE POWER IN CALIFORNIA
Karl Manheim* and Edward P. Howard**
Power to the people.
Slogan of the Black Panther Party'
Power To The People, right on.
John Lennon and the Plastic Ono Band2
All political power is inherent in the people.
California Constitution, Article II, Section 13
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of ultimate power in the people was hardly a revolu-
tionary concept when it was proclaimed in the California Constitu-
tion in 1849.4 After all, the preamble to the Federal Constitution of
1787 acknowledges such power as the exclusive authority for the new
national government.5 Even earlier, state constitutions expressed
similar sentiments.' Indeed, the political theory traces its roots back
* Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
** Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Executive Director,
Center for Law in the Public Interest. Both authors have served as counsel for
drafters and opponents of various California initiatives.
1. GILBERT MOORE, RAGE 287 (1971).
2. JOHN LENNON AND THE PLASTIC ONO BAND, Power To The People
(Apple Records 1971).
3. CAL. CoNST. art. II, § 1 ("All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have
the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.").
4. California adopted its first constitution while still a territory. Brigadeer
General Bennett Riley, the territory's appointed governor, reported it from con-
vention on October 12, 1849. The people ratified it on November 13, 1849, and it
went into effect by proclamation on December 20, 1849. See infra Part II.A.
5. See U.S. CONST. preamble ("We the People of the United States... do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.").
6. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. V ("[a]ll power resid[es] originally in
the people"); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 2 ("[a]ll political power is vested in
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to John Locke and beyond.7 Yet, popular sovereignty as a basic tenet
of democratic self-government can be manifested in different ways.
The framers of the Federal Constitution, for instance, strongly pre-
ferred republican forms of government over pure democracy.8
James Madison defined a "republic" as "a government in which
the scheme of representation takes place."9 He, along with Alexan-
der Hamilton, argued that only representative government could
both implement the people's will and filter out the passions and
prejudices of majority factions. 0 Pure democracy would produce a
"'tyranny of the majority..'.. The remedy for this "disease" lay in a
and derived from the people").
7. See Mortimer Sellers, Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law, 86 KY.
L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997-1998); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-
ism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428-37 (1987) (exploring the historical roots of popular
sovereignty in America).
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
9. Id. at 81.
10. For a definition of "factions," see infra note 38. In The Federalist No. 9,
Hamilton described his preferred model of republican government, which in-
cluded "the representation of the people in the legislature." THE FEDERALIST
No. 9, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "They are
means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided." Id. at 72-73. In The
Federalist No. 10, Madison was even more blunt in his distaste for direct democ-
racy:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular govern-
ment ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens....
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure de-
mocracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citi-
zens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit
of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.... Hence it is that such democ-
racies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of prop-
erty; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths....
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the
cure for which we are seeking.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859)
("[I]n political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally in-
cluded among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard."). Mill
clearly influenced Madison as The Federalist No. 10 demonstrates. See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is
of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the op-
pression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part."). Madison, in turn, had a similar influence on de Tocqueville.
See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (Richard D.
Heffner ed., Vintage Books 1980) (1835 & 1840) ("if ever the free institutions of
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"proper structure" for government." According to Madison, one of
the virtues of the Constitution was its "total exclusion of the people
in their collective capacity.' ' 13 Accordingly, some see ratification of
the Constitution, and the Federalists' triumph over the Anti-
Federalists, as a repudiation of direct democracy. 4
In accord with these sentiments, and in apparent conflict with
notions of popular sovereignty, the Federal Constitution has no
mechanism for lawmaking directly by the people. They may neither
pass nor repeal laws, nor even amend the Constitution, directly."
Any change in positive law must come via elected representatives, ei-
ther in the national Congress or, in the case of constitutional amend-
ment, in state legislatures or conventions. 6 Indeed, the United States
is one of only five democracies that has never held a national refer-
endum.'7
The lack of direct control over federal laws, taxes, and expendi-
tures has, at times, set the people against their own representatives in
what might be described as "popular revolts," albeit usually of the
non-violent kind. This is not to suggest that anti-government
America are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the omnipotence of the
majority").
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 8, at 84.
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). In fact, Madison opposed any form of direct popular control over
laws. See Kenneth Bresler, Rediscovering the Right to Instruct Legislators, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 355, 364 (1990-1991).
14. See Christopher Rohrbacher, A Conservative Defense of Romer v. Evans:
Colorado Amendment 2, State Initiatives, and the Guarantee Clause of the United
States Constitution (last modified May 21, 1997) <http://www.spc.uchicago.
edu/depts/polsci/research/american/rohr97.html>.
15. Scholars have debated whether Article V prescribes the exclusive means
for amending the Federal Constitution. Compare David R. Dow, When Words
Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1990) (arguing that maintaining Article V is the only way to amend the Consti-
tution), and Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121 (1996) (recognizing the
widespread belief that Article V is the exclusive method for amending the Con-
stitution), with Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (pointing out that the framers of the Constitu-
tion contemplated a system that allows the people to act outside the parameters
of the Constitution), and Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (arguing that
the people of the United States retain a right to amend the Constitution in ways
not expressly provided for by Article V).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
17. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Ini-
tiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13, 42 (1995).
18. While the "revolts" discussed here are typically against unpopular laws,
1167June 1998]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1165
movements have not resorted to arms, either in formal 9 or insurgent20
fashions. But discontent in modem times is more often expressed
through electoral means, such as anti-incumbency efforts2" and split
voting,2 and through devolution and down-sizing of government.24
There have also been repeated calls for initiatives and referenda on
the national level to check the power of CongressO5
In California, as in twenty-one other states, popular revolt
against perceived abuses or incapacity by the legislature can also take
the form of direct legislation.5 This is the initiative process, where
the judiciary has also been a target. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a
Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1970-72 (1988).
19. The best example of this is the Civil War, but there have been others,
such as the Don Rebellion, a "popular movement that challenged the existing
government in Rhode Island in the 1840s." Christian G. Fritz, Rethinking the
American Constitutional Tradition: National Dimensions in the Formation of
State Constitutions, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 969, 991 (1995) (reviewing DAVID A.
JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA,
1840-1890 (1992)).
20. This includes private anti-government militias and individual actions
taken against government symbols such as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building, actions by agencies such as the Ruby Ridge standoff against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the assassinations and attempted assassina-
tions of political figures.
21. See, e.g., Richard A. West, Jr., We the People: Limitations on Congres-
sional Terms Are Unconsitutional Content-Determinative Regulations, 46
RUTGERS L.J. 1787 (1994) (discussing anti-incumbency efforts by the American
people).
22. See, e.g., MARTIN P. WATrENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-
CENTERED POLITIcS 34 (1991).
23. See, e.g., Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time
for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 935-36 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (suggesting administrative
process as a preferred alternative to current trend of deregulation); Christina N.
Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax Collec-
tion, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627 (1997) (discussing the movement to privatize
the Internal Revenue Service).
25. One innovative idea was implemented by Ross Perot during his 1992
presidential campaign-the "electronic Town Hall." This was a system of video
and data transmission technologies that enabled voters nationwide to debate and
vote on legislation. See David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Di-
rect Democracy: William Simon U'ren and "The Oregon System," 67 TEMP. L.
REv. 947, 947 (1994).
26. The states (and adoption dates) are: Alaska (1959), Arizona (1912), Ar-
kansas (1910), Colorado (1910), Idaho (1912), Maine (1908), Massachusetts
(1918), Michigan (1913), Missouri (1908), Montana (1906), Nebraska (1912), Ne-
vada (1912), North Dakota (1914), Ohio (1912), Oklahoma (1907), Oregon
(1902), South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), Washington (1912), and Wyoming
(1968). See DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CrIZEN LAWMAKERS 217-77 (1989). In addi-
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the voters can propose and enact both statutes and constitutional
amendments without participation by their state representatives.2
Initiatives wholly bypass ordinary legislative processes and are in-
tended for just such a purpose. They can also disable or at least
cramp those processes, either by prohibiting their own amendment
outright, except by another vote of the people, or by requiring statu-
tory amendments enacted by the legislature to comply with specified
conditions.' Initiative constitutional amendments are, by definition,
are superior to any statute enacted by the legislature.' Yet, even ini-
tiative "statutes" have a special dignity which sets them above and
apart from statutes enacted by the legislature.'
It is therefore an understatement to observe that the people, in
whom "[a]ll political power" inheres,3 and their elected delegates are
sometimes at odds. Initiatives, both in concept and operation, reflect
a distrust for and a limitation on the legislature. The legislature, in
turn, does not always yield easily and may endeavor to reclaim lost
authority by amending initiative statutes after their enactment, often
under the guise of implementing or "furthering" legislation."
The struggle between power in the government and "power in
the people" requires substantial mediation, a task which falls on the
state's judiciary, usually the California Supreme Court.33 In recent
tion, Florida (1968) and Illinois (1970) allow for initiative constitutional amend-
ments, but not initiative statutes. See id. at 230-31, 233-35. Kentucky (1915),
Maryland (1915), and New Mexico (1911) allow for referendums, but not initia-
tives. See id. at 236, 239-40, 252-53. The District of Columbia (1970) also permits
initiatives and referendums for matters within home rule. See id. at 228-30. For
a more complete description of the various state initiative processes, see generally
Nathaniel Persily, The peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initia-
tive, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. &
POL'Y REv. 11 (1997).
27. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (describing the initiative process). A related
device is the referendum, which "is the power of the electors to approve or reject
statutes .... ." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a). These devices differ in that the former
bypasses the legislature completely, while the latter is triggered only after and in
response to legislative enactment of a law.
28. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
29. See infra Parts III.B., IV.A.
30. See infra notes 213-219 and accompanying text; see also CAL. CONST. art.
II, § 10(c) (providing that the legislature may repeal or amend initiative statutes
only when permitted by the electors).
31. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
32. See, e.g., Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal. 4th 1243, 906 P.2d
1112, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12 (1995).
33. Between 1964 and 1992, California courts invalidated six of thirty-five
initiatives approved by California voters, partially invalidated another eight, and
left sixty percent fully intact. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN
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years a spate of cases has answered some long'standing and impor-
tant questions about initiatives. They have not, however, engaged a
basic inquiry into the initiative power or its compatibility with repub-
lican theory. Courts, it seems, are often reluctant to question under-
lying principles of direct democracy, either because they believe
themselves jurisdictionally incompetent to do so,'" or are simply un-
willing to take on the very electorate that keeps state judges in of-
fice. 5 Critical inquiries, therefore, usually occur only in dissents36 and
in law review articles.
Indeed, the current debate about the initiative power mirrors the
larger debate, over two centuries old, about the wisdom of democ-
racy itself. Critics of the California initiative basically echo the cri-
tiques by Alexander Hamilton and the early Federalists. Hamilton
wrote the following about the ability of lay people to govern them-
selves: "Why has government been instituted at all? Because the
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice
without constraint." Madison expressed similar concern and stated:
"But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be neces-
sary.' 38 Similarly, initiative critics argue that initiatives are "plagued
by voter ignorance, [and] voter apathy."39
On the other side, initiative defenders echo some of the rebuttals
of the Jeffersonian democrats. Thomas Jefferson noted that "the
mass of citizens is the safest depository of their own rights and.., the
FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE 17-18 (1992).
34. See Oregon v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997); California Gillnetters
Ass'n v. Department of Fish and Game, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
338 (1995); Lowe v. Keisling, 882 P.2d 91 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
35. State judges, it should be remembered, are typically elected. In Califor-
nia, appellate court justices must stand for retention every twelve years. See
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. Their tenure is thus far more uncertain than their
federal counterparts, who "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
36. See, e.g., Sawyer, 932 P.2d at 1164-76 (Durham, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 11, at 322. As discussed earlier,
Madison was particularly concerned with the threat of faction, which he de-
scribes as "a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 8, at 78.
39. Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabil-
ity and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 737
(1988).
1170
THE INITIATIVE POWER
evils flowing from the duperies of the people [ ] are less injurious
than those from the egoism of their agents."' Proponents of direct
legislation likewise argue that the initiative results in "increased gov-
ernment responsiveness to the will of the people, greater citizen par-
ticipation and a better-informed electorate" and that "[ilt is a safe-
guard against the concentration of political power in the hands of a
few."
41
Recent experiences with California initiatives have only intensi-
fied the debate. Opponents have challenged in court nearly every
significant ballot proposition in recent years, many times success-
fully.4' Even when these suits are unsuccessful, protracted court
challenges often substantially delay or alter an initiative's
40. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816, in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 668, 672-73 (Adrienne Koch
& William Peden eds., 1944).
41. SCHMIDT, supra note 26, at 25-26. Jefferson might be sympathetic with
critics of the initiative process in the area of rights for minorities and the politically
disenfranchised. Some critics of direct legislation have warned of its potential for
isolating and disproportionately harming minorities. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum- Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2
(1978). This complaint mirrors Madison's insistence upon a federal bill of rights as
a bulwark against just such majoritarian abuses. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison
wrote:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instru-
ment of the major number of the constituents.... What use then it may
be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular Governments? ... The po-
litical truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the
character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they be-
come incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses
of interest and passion.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in 11 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298-99 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., Univ. Press of Va.
1977) (1788-1789).
42. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (challenging Proposition 187, which denied benefits to certain
immigrants); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 747
F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (challenging Proposition 73); Quackenbush v. Supe-
rior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 459, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271 (1997) (challenging proposi-
tion 213, which restricted damage recovery by uninsured drivers); Taxpayers to
Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799
P.2d 1220,274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990) (seeking enforcement of provisions in Proposi-
tion 68, which proposed to regulate political campaign spending); Amador Valley
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d
1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (challenging Proposition 13 relating to real property
taxes).
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implementation.'u Aside from the seemingly perpetual litigation,
many feel that the initiative process is "out of control," 44 either in its
structural disregard for minority interests45 or its patent inability to
comprehend complex legislative matters. 6 Understandably, defend-
ers of the initiative process view these legal and political assaults as
attacks on democracy itself, obstructions to the "people's will." 47
The public debate on participatory democracy will go on, mostly
in the press and legal scholarship and occasionally in court. But, un-
less some formal restraint is imposed on the initiative power-an un-
likely prospect in the near future-initiatives themselves will con-
tinue unabated. Indeed, seventeen initiatives appeared on statewide
43. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 790 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Cal.
1992); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216, 878 P.2d 566, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 807 (1994) (challenging Proposition 103, relating to insurance rate reduc-
tion and regulation); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805,771 P.2d 1247,
258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989). As the federal district court in Fireman's Fund noted:
Insurers doing business in California certainly have a right to
challenge any unconstitutional aspects of the rate making process which
have been forced on them by the initiative. But the multiple and over-
lapping assertions of these challenges in state court, before the Com-
missioner, and in this court causes this court to question those tactics.
Numerous insurers are involved in these multiple challenges, some rep-
resented by the same law firms. Some challenges are filed in state court
and some are filed in federal. The challenges are at the same time iden-
tical, separate and overlapping. Some of that appears to be coordinated
and calculated....
Fireman's Fund, 790 F. Supp. at 964.
44. Initiatives: The Monster That Threatens California Politics, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1990, at B4.
45. See, e.g., Julia Anne Guizan, Comment, Is the California Civil Rights Ini-
tiative a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? Distinguishing Constitutional Amendment
from Revision in California's Initiative Process, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 261 (1997);
Katherine M. Hamill, Case Comment, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal Pro-
tection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REV. 655 (1997); Joseph S.
Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal
Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453 (1997); L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action
California Style-Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding a Fatal
Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 281
(1997).
46. Initiative drafters often sacrifice comprehensive explication of an issue to
achieve textual simplicity, in the often correct belief that this enhances the meas-
ure's likelihood of success at the polls. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 33, at 10.
47. Even judges question the damage done to democracy when courts enjoin
or invalidate initiative measures. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 692, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1997). But see, e.g., Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp.
1446, 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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California ballots in 1996.4' As of this Article's publication, ten ini-
tiatives have qualified for the 1998 primary and general elections49
and thirty-one more are in circulation and may qualify before the
June 25 cut-off date!" These numbers do not even include the
countless initiatives appearing on local ballots.51
Despite some of the philosophical questions raised in this intro-
duction, this Article has a relatively narrow purpose. It is not to ex-
plore the relative merits or demerits of republican government versus
direct democracy. Those issues are amply explored elsewhere52 and
there is little we could add to justify another law review article. In-
stead, this Article focuses on one aspect of the broader debate-the
exact contours of the initiative power in California, a state at the
radical end of the direct democracy spectrum. Despite nearly a cen-
tury of initiative-making, the precise texture of the initiative power
remains unsettled. This Article explores some of those uncertainties.
In the following sections we discuss the history of the initiative
process in California, its theoretical underpinnings, the plain text of
the constitution, limitations on the initiative power, and its place in
48. Five initiative statutes were on the March, 1996 primary ballot. See
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 3 (Mar. 26, 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 PRIMARY ELECrION BALLOT]. Twelve initiative statutes were on
the November 1996 general election ballot. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECnON 3 (Nov. 5, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 GENERAL ELECTON
BALLOT]. The legislature placed an additional ten measures on the 1996 ballots.
See 1996 PRIMARY ELECTION BALLOT, at 3 (6 additional); 1996 GENERAL
ELECTION BALLOT, at 3 (3 additional); CALIFORNIA SUPPLEMENTAL BALLOT
PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 3 (Mar. 26,1996) (1 additional).
49. See California Secretary of State <http://www.ss.ca.gov> (last visitied June
17, 1998); California Voter Foundation, 1998 California Election Preview (visited
Apr. 8, 1998) <http://www.calvoter.orglcuf/home.html>.
50. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9013 (West 1996). The frequent use of the ini-
tiatives is a relatively new phenomenon. From the early years of the initiative
until 1974, the number of measures that qualified for the ballot was relatively
small. From 1912 to 1974, with the exception of a nine year period, the number
of measures that qualified was under ten, and the number making it to the ballot
was under three. In some years no measures qualified. Since 1974 the average
number of initiative measures approved for circulation has been 25. The number
actually making it to the ballot has been about four. Of the 76 that have been
approved over the last 84 years, 32, or about one-half, have been approved in the
last fifteen years. See California Secretary of State, supra note 49.
51. Initiative and referendum powers may be exercised at the local level. See
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (authorizing such powers for general law cities); Id. at
art. XI, § 3(c) (setting out such powers for charter cities).
52. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Gov-
ernment Popular Sovereignity, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 749 (1994); Elizabeth R. Leong, Note, Ballot Initiatives &
Identifiable Minorities: A Textual Call to Congress, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 677 (1997).
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the overall system of governance. We also suggest, somewhat tenta-
tively, that enactment of the initiative power in 1911 may have devi-
ated from prescribed constitutional procedures and may be theoreti-
cally suspect.
No discussion of the initiative power, however, can begin with-
out a discussion of the historical forces that led to the adoption of the
initiative process in the first place. Such a discussion provides the
very denominator of California's initiative power, its case law, and
citizens' and jurists' sometimes bafflingly stubborn faith in direct de-
mocracy.
II. ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE POWER IN CALIFORNIA
A. The Bear Flag Republic
As long as there have been "Californians," there have been
popular skepticism and restlessness with established authorities. The
area we now know as California was colonized by Spain beginning in
the mid-seventeenth century.," After Mexico's independence from
Spain in 1821, the area became a department of Mexico-Alta Cali-
fornia-with its capital at Monterey.m Mexican political and military
control was weak 5 however, and local ranchers, known as
"Californios," periodically rebelled against the Mexican authorities.
When Anglo settlers began arriving in small numbers in the
1830s, the Californians generally welcomed them.56 The Americans
began assimilating into local culture and even assumed important
government posts.5 Californians and Americans had a lot in com-
mon, particularly their dislike of Mexican military authority, trade,
53. See Myra K. Saunders, California Legal History: The Legal System Under
the United States Military Government, 1846-1849, 88 L. LIBR. J. 488, 488 (1996).
54. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CALIFORNIA 54-55 (Frank H. Gille ed., 1984).
55. Spanish control had also been weak. As early as 1804, United States Na-
val Captain William Shaler "said that the Spaniards had removed every obstacle
from the path of an invading enemy... [and that] '[i]t would be as easy to keep
California in spite of the Spaniards as it would be to wrest it from them in the
first place."' CARDINAL GOODwIN, M.A., THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE
GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 1-2 (1914).
56. See Saunders, supra note 53, at 489 ("Estimates of the non-native popula-
tion do not exceed ten thousand in 1846, with well over two-thirds of that num-
ber being Latino."). As late as 1844 "probably not more than 100 Americans re-
sided in all California." WILLIAM J. PALMER AND PAUL P. SELVIN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN CALIFORNIA 12 (1983).. The foreign population-
including Americans-grew to 2000 by 1846. See id.
57. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 6-7.
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and land laws. In 1836 a group of Californians, assisted by some
Americans, staged a revolt and drove the Mexican governor from
power." They proclaimed California independent of Mexico and
named Mariano Vallejo "commandante general" and Juan Alvarado
governor of California.59 Mexico effectively quashed this revolt when
it recognized Alvarado as governor.
60
Through resistance and defiance of Mexican authority, Califor-
nians were able to establish a fair degree of autonomy.61 It was
widely believed, in Washington and abroad, that California was ripe
for the picking.62 Many American settlers professed that "'California
was to fulfil[l] its "manifest destiny" and become a part of the United
States."'6' Indeed, the United States Navy had standing orders to oc-
cupy California in the event of war with Mexico. 64
Based on a false rumor of war, Commodore Thomas Jones of the
Pacific Fleet sailed to Monterey on October 20, 1842, and "captured"
California in a bloodless coup.65 The next day, Jones examined offi-
cial communications from Mexico and, realizing his mistake, simply
"gave" back the state.66
Captain John C. Fremont of the United States Army Topog-
raphical Engineers arrived in California in early 1846 with sixty well-
armed men on a "scientific expedition."6'7 In an effort to rekindle the
earlier revolt, Fremont unsuccessfully sought to provoke both
American settlers and Mexican authorities with rumors of Mexican
military action.'
58. See id at 8-9.
59. See id
60. See id.
61. The Californios were fairly autonomous during the entire secessionary
period. See Thomas H. Benton, The Acquisition of California (last modified
Mar. 17, 1998) <http://we.got.net/docent/explore/hbent8.html>; see also Califor-
nia History: Mexican Period (last modified Nov. 11, 1996) <http://www.ccnet.
com/-laplaza/calhist3.html> (noting the self-sufficiency of the Californios).
62. See generally Saunders, supra note 53, at 490 (discussing the interest of
the United States in California); see also California History: Mexican Period, su-
pra note 56 (stating a number of factors for the American government's desire to
acquire California).
63. Saunders, supra note 53, at 490 (citation omitted).
64. See id.
65. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 15.
66. See id.
67. The Bear Flag Revol" The First Step in California's March to Statehood
(last modified May 6, 1997) <http://intergate.rbuhsd.kl2.ca.us/adobedocs/page3.
html>.
68. See id
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War with Mexico was eventually declared on May 13, 1846.69 On
June 14 two dozen insurgent settlers, belatedly joined by Fremont,
invaded the small Mexican fortress at Sonoma, the northern-most
city under Mexican rule. ° The rebels captured its occupant, retired
General Mariano Vallejo.71 Vallejo demurred upon capture, prefer-
ring instead to join the insurgency, as he had done a decade earlier.'
As one of the insurgents put it, "We tried to find an enemy, but could
not."7
The lack of any defense miffed the rebels somewhat. They
raised a flag containing a crude rendition of a grizzly bear and the
words "California Republic" to prove their conquest.74 The "Bear
Flag Revolt" was bloodless and brief. William B. Ide assumed com-
mand of the operation, becoming the first and only "President" of the
Bear Flag Republic.75 Foreshadowing later constitutional tenets, he
issued a proclamation pledging "to establish and perpetuate a liberal,
a just and honorable Government [that] must originate among its
people: its officers should be its servants. 76
The Republic was short-lived. The "bear flaggers" successfully
defended their conquest against Mexican troops on June 24 at the
Battle of Olompali.' "Casualties were high by California standards":
there were two fatalities on each side.7 The rebels, however, were
not so lucky against the United States Navy. On July 7 Commodore
John Drake Sloat of the Pacific Squadron sailed into Monterey and
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id; see generally The United States and California (last modified June
25, 1997) <http://lcweb2.loc. gov/ammemlcbhtml/cbstates.html> (describing the
Bear Flag Revolt).
72. Vallejo eventually returned to Sonoma after California joined the United
States. He went on "to serve as a delegate to the California Constitutional Con-
vention, and later as a State Senator." Raising of the Bear Flag (last modified
June 21, 1996) <http://www.vom.comlbearflag/revolt.html>.
73. John Bidwell, Frbmont in the Conquest of California (last modified Dec.
7, 1997) <http://sheU3.ba.best.coml-sfmuseumlhist6/fremont.html>.
74. See id. A picture of the original bear flag can be found at this internet
site.
75. See Museum of the City of San Francisco, Gold Rush Chronology 1846-
1849 (last modified Aug. 8, 1997) <http://sheU3.ba.best.com/sfmuseum/hist
chronl.html> [hereinafter Gold Rush Chronology].
76. After the Raising: The Proclamation (last modified Feb. 2, 1998) <http://
www.vom.comibearflag/afterrev.html>.
77. See Olompali State Historical Park (last modified July 29, 1997) <http://
www.indiana.edu/-maritime/caparks/spanmex olompali.html>.
78. The Bear Flag Revolt (last modified Mar. 6, 1997) <http://www.ccnet.
com/-laplaza/calhist4.html>.
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raised an American flag over the customs house.79 He then posted a
proclamation declaring California annexed to the United States.80
The Republic's brief sovereignty formally came to an end on
July 9, 1846, when the Bear Flag was taken down in Sonoma and re-
placed with the twenty-eight-star American flag."1 At that time
Commodore Robert Stockton, who replaced Sloat, declared Califor-
nia a territory of the United States and appointed a territorial gov-
ernment.Y
At first there was little resistance to American occupation. But
in Fall 1846 harsh military rule lead to a counter-revolt by Califor-
nians in the southern part of the state.n At the battles of Los Ange-
les and San Pascual, the Californians were victorious; however, the
large American force, led by Stockton and Army General Stephen
Kearny, eventually overwhelmed them.' They surrendered in the
San Fernando valley on January 13, 1847, in what is known as the
"Cahuenga Capitulation." 5 Mexico formally ceded the state on Feb-
ruary 2, 1848, in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." Nine days later,
gold was discovered at Sutter's Mill.
After Florida was acquired from Spain, the Supreme Court ruled
that Spanish law must be preserved in the territory until such time as
Congress affirmatively changed it, or the state was admitted to the
79. See GoODWIN, supra note 55, at 13-14.
80. See id. at 14. As with Jones before him, Sloat had "secret orders" to take
California as soon as war had been declared with Mexico. It had, but Sloat did not
know it. Rather, he took the state because he had heard about the revolution in
Sonoma and feared that the British, who were sailing toward Monterey with a large
naval force, would exploit the political vacuum and claim the state. See Gold Rush
Chronology, supra note 76.
81. Navy Lieutenant Joseph Warren Revere, Paul Revere's grandson, per-
formed the ceremony. See After the Raising: The Proclamation, supra note 76.
82. See Saunders, supra note 53, at 491. Stockton appointed Fremont, who
was later court-martialed for insubordination, as governor. General Stephen
Keamey, who served as governor until June 1847, replaced Fremont. Colonel
Richard Barnes Mason succeeded Kearny and was himself succeeded by General
Bennett Riley. Riley was the last military governor of the state. In December
1849, a civilian government began functioning. See id. at 491-92.
83. See id. at 489.
84. See GoODWIN, supra note 55, at 17.
85. See The Bear Flag Revolt, supra note 78; The United States and California,
supra note 71.
86. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic
of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922.
87. See Gold Rush Chronology, supra note 75; The History of How California
Became a State (last modified Aug. 8, 1997) <http://www.ccnet.coml-laplaza/
calhist.html>.
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Union.' It was felt that this precedent, as well as international law
generally, required the same result for California. Accordingly, the
legal regime under military occupation was fundamentally a con-
tinuation of Mexican law. 89 This included the "alcalde," or mayoral,
political structure." However, once the peace treaty was signed with
Mexico, military control should have ended, but did not. As a terri-
tory of the United States, Congress could have passed legislation for
California, but it did not.9' Instead, Mexican law, as modified to fit
local conditions-including mining claims resulting from the gold
rush-continued to be enforced by military governors.9
Congress was unable to form a territorial government for Cali-
fornia because it was embroiled in a bitter debate over California's
status-slave or free soil.? Settlers, now arriving by the thousands
due to the gold rush, demanded recognition and an end to military
and Alcalde governance.94 Yet, congressional paralysis left California
in a state of legal limbo for three years. It was not even clear whether
California was under military or civilian rule in the three years prior
88. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828).
89. See Palmer v. Low, 98 U.S. 1, 15 (1878) (stating that if the United States
government could not regulate the form of conveyances of land in California af-
ter its conquest by military forces, then Mexican law was preserved). Influential
members of Congress required observance of Mexican law. See GOODWIN, supra
note 55, at 21.
90. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 61-63. Although it was unauthorized, the
Alcaldes, an increasing number of whom were Anglos, began looking to the
common law for substance. See Saunders, supra note 53, at 494.
91. See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193 (1853) (validating de
facto rule by existing military governor because of inaction by President and
Congress).
92. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 335, 10 P. 674, 719 (1886) ("Between the
transfer of California to the United States, by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
and the admission of this state into the Union, no territorial government was
here established. The purely municipal law of Mexico continued in force within
this territory until modified or entirely changed by appropriate authority."); see
also People v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 658-65, 375 P.2d 641, 649-54, 25 Cal. Rptr.
697, 705-10 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of government
in California); Saunders, supra note 53, at 493-503 (discussing how military lead-
ers in California chose to continue the existing Mexican legal structure).
93. The debate may also have "edged the country closer to civil war." Pat
Ooley, State Governance: An Overview of the History of Constitutional Provi-
sions Dealing with State Governance (last modified July 15, 1997)
<http://Iibrary.ca.gov/caifomrnia/CCRClreports/html/hs -state--governance.html>.
Some members of Congress also objected to California's annexation on separa-
tion of powers grounds. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 20-23.
94. See generally GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 63-65 (discussing dissatisfaction
with Alcaldes).
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to its admission to the Union." At least one California official denied
that any legitimate government existed at all."
As early as 1847 local newspapers urged the convening of a con-
stitutional convention to cure "'the existing order of things,"' particu-
larly the lack of civil government and recognition by CongressY By
1849 the pressure to establish a formal government became intense."
At the suggestion of President Zachary Taylor, Governor Riley
called for a constitutional convention to be held in Monterey in Sep-
tember 1849.9 Forty-eight delegates were selected at local elections,
including Mariano Vallejo and seven other original Californios.0 °
In drafting the document, the delegates principally relied on the
constitutions of other states, particularly those that had recently writ-
ten or revised their charters.' The delegates most heavily copied the
constitutions of Iowa and New York.' 2 The delegates also retained
several key aspects of Mexican law,' including property rights for
95. See id. at 221 & n.2 (noting that Governor Riley claimed that he had
authority from Washington to establish a civil and "de facto military govern-
ment").
96. See id. at 221-23.
97. Id. at 63.
98. See id. at 75-77.
99. See Ooley, supra note 93.
100. See Achieving Statehood (last modified Mar. 28, 1997) <http://www.ccnet.
com/l-aplaza/calhist5.html>.
101. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 177,231-35,237-43. Books of the various
state constitutions were widely available in 1849. The experiences of other states
were influential not only in drafting the California Constitution but those of
other states as well. See Fritz, supra note 19, at 982. ("[B]oth of California's
conventions and the Oregon and Nevada conventions had access to all the extant
state constitutions at the time they met.... [This] is suggestive of constitutional
borrowing that hardly occurred haphazardly or without serious reflection."); see
also PALMER & SELVIN, supra note 57, at 13-14 (discussing the composition of
California's Constitutional Convention); REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE-CONiENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 50 (1846) (referring to a "book called 'American
Constitutions' which contained synopses of the several state constitutions then
extant) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT OF THE DEBATES].
102. See Ooley, supra note 93 and accompanying text. According to John
Ross Browne's Report of the Debates, 1849, delegate William M. Gwin said that
he had selected the constitution of Iowa, because it was one of the latest and the
shortest. See J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN
SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 24 (Arno Press Inc. 1973) (1850). They may
also have selected New York because it was the native state of the largest num-
ber of delegates-eleven. See VIII ROCKWELL DENNIS HUNT, THE GENESIS OF
CALIFORNIA'S FIRST CONSTITUTION (1846-49), at 55 (1895).
103. Indeed, the constitution specifically preserved Mexican law. See Schedule
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women,' but rejected others, such as suffrage for native peoples. 5
The constitution also prohibited slavery and allowed free blacks into
the state. ' It did not, however, allow for direct democracy through
the devices then known-the referendum' 07 and "instruction and re-
call." °
The people of California ratified the constitution on November
13, 1849, by a vote of 12,872 to 811209 It was submitted to Congress
the following year and, "on due examination, [it was] found to be re-
publican in its form of government." California became the thirty-
first state on September 9, 1850.'
to the Constitution, § 1, reprinted in 1850 Cal. Stat. 34 ("[A]Il laws in force at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, until
altered or repealed by the Legislature, shall continue as if the same had not been
adopted."). The constitution itself was published in its two official languages-
English and Spanish. See GOODWIN, supra note 55, at 226. This was pursuant to
a specification in the document that all laws were to be published in English and
Spanish. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 21 (1849).
104. See Achieving Statehood, supra note 100.
105. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1849).
106. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1849); see generally HUNT, supra note 102, at
48-49.
107. Connecticut was the first state to use the referendum process, beginning
in 1818. See SIMEON E. BALDWIN, MODERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 48 (1898).
108. "Instruction" refers to the right of the people to direct their legislators on
how to vote. See Bresler, supra note 13, at 355 (1991). "Recall" refers to a proc-
ess in which the people vote to remove a public official. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1267 (6th ed. 1990). Four of the original states allowed for instruc-
tion and recall in their constitutions. See MASs. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIX;
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XXXII; PA.
CONST. of 1776, art. XVI. The latter two omitted the provisions when they re-
vised their constitutions shortly after the Union formed. See Rohrbacher, supra
note 14; see generally Bresler, supra (discussing state enactments of the power of
instruction). Instruction was also used by state legislatures to control their dele-
gations in the United States Senate, insofar as senators were selected by state
legislatures until 1913, when the 17th amendment was adopted. See generally Jay
S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1997) (discussing senate elec-
tion procedures prior to the Seventeenth Amendment) [hereinafter Bybee, Ulys-
ses at the Mast].
Although the initiative resembles the early American practice of instruction
and recall, it cannot actually be used for that purpose. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36
Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984) (striking from ballot a pro-
posed initiative requiring the legislature to call for a federal constitutional con-
vention to enact a balanced budget amendment).
109. See PALMER & SELVIN, supra note 57, at 16 n.29. Stormy weather on
election day-December 20, 1849-may have accounted for the low voter turn-
out. See id.
110. Act of Admission of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452 (1850). It was
customary in the mid-nineteenth century for Congress to examine the
"republican character" of constitutions of states seeking admission. See, e.g., Act
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B. Second Constitutional Convention
What began as a loose alliance of scattered towns and forts soon
coalesced into a unified state government. The economy boomed,
due in no small part to the gold rush, and the state prospered. Within
a few years, the legislature assumed broad dominion over the state's
political subdivisions. Yet revolutionary spirit that founded the state
seemed to be lost on our political leaders, who became increasingly
beholden to special interests.
The post-Civil War period saw rapid industrial expansion, with
attendant class consequences-accumulation of vast wealth in a rela-
tive few, including corporations,"2 and the creation of a large laboring
class."' As early as 1857, attempts were made to convene a new con-
stitutional convention to cure perceived defects in the original and to
corral the growing power of corporations. 4 Calls for a convention
were defeated in 1857, 1859, 1873, and 1875. The last defeat deserves
special mention. The Democratic state convention of 1875 was over-
whelmingly in favor of a convention "'as the only mode of creating a
system of government at once harmonious and efficient.""'-' Voting
at such a convention was accomplished not by the marking of ballots
but simply by submitting the ballot of one's choice, the ballot itself
stating a voting preference on its face. At the urging of a prominent
railroad lawyer, the Democratic state central committee had all the
ballots printed with "'For a Convention"' on one side and "'Against a
Convention"' on the other."6 Accordingly, an equal number of votes
were cast for each proposition, and a convention was defeated."'
Amidst these shenanigans, the depression of 1873-1878 wors-
ened. It caused widespread poverty while the industrial class seemed
for the Admission of the States of Iowa and Florida into the Union, 5 Stat. 742
(1845).
111. See Act of Admission of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
112. See BALDWIN, supra note 107, at 63 ("Corporations . . .represent,
probably, four-fifths of the wealth and industry of the country, apart from lands
occupied as homesteads.").
113. See Ooley, supra note 93, at n.7 and accompanying text.
114. As one delegate to the 1878 convention put it: "'I have learned... that
the ship of state is rotten from truck to kelson; that the three great departments
of the state are full of corruption; that you cannot trust the executive department;
that you should have no confidence in the judicial department; and that the legis-
lative department has sunk beyond plummet reach."' CARL BRENT SwIsHER,
MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION 1878-79, at 95 (1930).
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id.
117. See id.
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to prosper and tighten its control on state government.118 Scandals
erupted involving fraud and graft by the railroads and state and local
governments. 9 Reform movements and "deep[ ] distrust of the legis-
lature"' 20 consequently grew even more intense, resulting in the legis-
lature of 1875-1876 again putting the question of a call on the ballot.
It was approved at the 1877 election and our second constitutional
convention opened the following year.
21
The convention of 1878 was dominated by lawyers and farm-
ers.'2 This pleased conservatives at first, but strategic voting by the
Workingmen's Party delegates and deep animosity toward the rail-
roads led to the convention imposing severe restrictions on corpora-
tions.ln As word of this spread, the state's leading newspapers grew
critical of the delegates. Nonetheless, by the end of the convention
the delegates were in an independent mood, often ignoring their po-
litical alliances. "[T]he delegates looked upon themselves as more
truly the representatives of 'the people' than any subsequently cho-
sen legislators [would be], and thought it their duty to include a large
amount of important legislation in the constitution, where it would
not be easily subject to change."'24 The document which emerged in
1879
was forged in an atmosphere of discord, apprehension about
conditions in the state, and great hostility toward legislators
who were thought to have ignored serious problems while
catering to special interests.... The Sacramento delegates
were not only "determined to cinch capital, tax mortgages,
and expel the Chinese, they were also determined to put the
legislature in its place. Session after session charges of
incompetence and corruption had been made .... The
118. See id. at 7-11.
119. See Ooley, supra note 93.
120. JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 14-
15 (1993).
121. California's drive for a new constitution was not unique. During the pro-
gressive era, between 1872 and 1913, twenty-six states called constitutional con-
ventions to revise their charters. See Ooley, supra note 93. The constitution was
adopted on March 3, 1879, ratified on May 7, 1879, and went into effect for elec-
tion of officers on July 4, 1879, and generally on January 1, 1880. See SWISHER,
supra note 114, at 101, 109.
122. Of the 152 delegates, 57 were lawyers and 39 were farmers. See SWISHER,
supra note 114, at 25.
123. See id. at 45-65.
124. Id. at 65.
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convention set out to chastise the legislature by limiting its
sphere of action....""
As Justice Hans Linde has noted, resentment of Sacramento was
so strong that some delegates proposed abolishing the legislature al-
together.' 6 Instead, the convention imposed severe restrictions on
legislative and corporate power,7' so much so that the constitution
almost doubled in length.'2 Among the significant transformations of
power was the establishment of "home rule" for California cities.
This reform sought to decentralize power in the mistrusted state gov-
ernment by guaranteeing local autonomy. 9 Still, it was the problem
of railroads that commanded the most attention. Indeed, controlling
the railroad corporations "was undoubtedly one of the major pur-
poses for which the constitutional convention was called."''
125. James E. Castello, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative
Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REv. 491, 554-55 (1986)
(quoting in part SWISHER, supra note 114, at 96).
126. See Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 709,718 n.37 (1994). As Justice Linde wrote:
[s]o strong was the sentiment against legislative activism that a Work-
mgman's party delegate proposed an article declaring: "There shall be
no legislature convened from and after the adoption of this Constitu-
tion .... and any person who shall be guilty of suggesting that a Legisla-
ture be held, shall be punished as a felon without the benefit of clergy."
Id. (citing MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 113 (1977)).
127. This phenomenon was repeated throughout the country. See BALDWIN,
supra note 108, at 57 ("The chief design of ... constitution-making for the last
ten or twenty years of the century... was to reduce the field of statute law, and
withold from [the legislature] every subject which it is not necessary to con-
cede.").
128. See SWISHER, supra note 114, at 101.
129. The drafters designed the 1879 constitution to 'emancipate municipal
governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by the
Legislature."' Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th 389, 395, 841 P.2d 990, 993, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 470, 473 (1992) (quoting People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880)). A
constitutional amendment in 1896 authorizing cities to adopt freeholder charters
further expanded local power. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, §§ 6, 8
(amended 1894, 1914). This not only gave chartered cities authority to manage
their own affairs, but it further insulated them from legislative scrutiny. See
Johnson, 4 Cal. 4th at 396, 841 P.2d at 994, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (citing Fragley
v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383 (1899) (stating that 1896 amendment "was intended to
give municipalities the sole right to regulate, control, and govern their internal
conduct")).
130. SWISHER, supra note 114, at 45.
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C. The Banana Republic of California
Despite having enacted a new constitution, the spirit of reform
quickly disappeared. Liberal Democrats and Workingmen candi-
dates split the vote in the Fall 1879 election, allowing for "a conser-
vative Republican sweep of the legislature and executive branch.''
"The 1880 legislature... effectively sabotaged [reform] provisions of
the constitution which were inimical to conservative interests.',
32
Virtually every California legislator and judge owed his office to the
Southern Pacific. Collis P. Huntington and his Northern and South-
ern California operatives hand-picked most of the state and local
candidates for public office.'33 Even a popular incumbent republican
governor who won whenever there was a primary was unceremoni-
ously dumped by the Southern Pacific at the 1906 GOP convention.'s
One member of the legislature observed that "[s]carcely a vote was
cast in either house that did not show some aspect of Southern Pacific
ownership, petty vengeance, or legislative blackmail."'35 Indeed, "in
the thirty years following adoption of the 1879 constitution, not a
single bill opposed by the Southern Pacific Railroad was enacted in
Sacramento.', 3 6 In addition to its control over politics, the railroad
openly traded offices such as judgeships.'7 As a result, what the cor-
porations were unable to achieve through the legislature, they ac-
complished through litigation.
While the examples of the railroad's dominance in every nook
and cranny of the state are legion,'38 a few suffice to illustrate how
thoroughly basic precepts of free enterprise, civil rule, and democ-
racy were squelched in California by a single corporation single-
mindedly pursuing its financial interests. Southern Pacific success-
fully blackmailed the city of Los Angeles into ceding sixty acres of
land and the then-enormous sum of $600,000 to the railroad by
threatening to build new lines that went around, rather than through,
the city.'39 The railroad owned the entire Oakland waterfront 40 so
131. See Ooley, supra note 93.
132. Id.
133. See GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PRoGRESsIVES 12-13 (1951).
134. See id. at 57-58.
135. Id. at 63.
136. Castello, supra note 125, at 555.
137. See MOWRY, supra note 133, at 59.
138. See id. at 62-64 (illustrating Southern Pacific's influence on the general elec-
tion of 1906).
139. See id- at 9.
140. See id at 10.
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Oakland's citizens and business people could not get around the rail-
road's concomitant monopoly on ferry service to and from San Fran-
cisco.'4 1 When, in an effort to break the monopoly, the city claimed
shore rights at the end of Main Street, the railroad simply fenced off
the area of land it owned in deep water, blocking any threat to its
monopoly.42 Likewise, when a competitor dared to commence ferry
service, his wharves were blocked by railroad trams, his boats were
rammed, and coal dust was spewed over his passengers. 3 The rail-
road was the largest landowner in California.144 It would set its rates
for commercial transport in part by forcing less powerful businesses,
utterly dependent upon the railroad's transportation monopoly, to
open their books. 45 The railroad would then increase its rates if the
business was having a profitable month.' 6
The Southern Pacific Railroad dominated California's economy
and politics so completely that the state was akin to a third-world
"Banana Republic."'47 As with a stereotypical Banana Republic, the
Southern Pacific Railroad in California at the turn of the century was
simply more powerful than any potentially competing business or
civil rival, including the state itself. It had more money and human
capital, and it was not timid about using its influence in the most bra-
zen ways to advance its interests."
D. The Republican Rescue
This dominance was not, as one might think, eventually broken
by a cabal of determined radicals or revolutionaries based in San
Francisco. The revolution was spearheaded by conservative, Los
Angeles-based, Republican lawyers, reporters, and professionals in-
fluenced by Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, not Karl
Marx. 49 The movement found its broadest support not among labor,
but in the Southern California middle merchant classes, who not only
coveted a larger share of the profits from Southern California's
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id at 11.
145. See id. at 9, 11.
146. See id. at 9.
147. See id at 1-22.
148. See id at 12. See also Persily, supra note 26, at 24.
149. See MowRY, supra note 133, at 22.
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economic expansion," but who also frowned upon political corrup-
tion as being inimical to their devoutly Protestant, Midwestern heri-
tages.'s'
When these merchant activists took up the cause of breaking the
railroad's grip on the GOP, the remedy of direct democracy was an
option. Since 1895 Dr. Randolph Haynes, a determined political re-
former, had been agitating with some groundbreaking successes in
cities throughout the state for direct legislation. 5 The reform
movement that would eventually lead to enactment of the statewide
initiative was born in 1907 when an accident of seating led eventually
to sweeping political reform just four years later. Edward Dickson
and Chester Rowell were two journalists who sat in adjoining seats
during the 1907 legislative session, the "worst" ever in terms of how
blatantly Southern Pacific ran the show. 3 Rowell worked for
Fresno's aptly named conservative Morning Republican and Dickson
worked for the equally GOP-faithful Express of Los Angeles.""
Again, this was the heyday of progressive Teddy Roosevelt and Taft
Republicanism. Together, these two reporters set out to remove the
GOP from the grip of the Southern Pacific and bring the party into
the national Republican mainstream.155
On February 20, 1907, the Morning Republican called for a re-
form movement within the GOP."6 Dickson started traveling around
the state in an attempt to elicit the support of like-minded Republi-
cans for an initial organizational meeting."' On May 21 fifteen peo-
ple attended a meeting that Dickson called and organized at Levy's
Cafe in downtown Los Angeles.5 The group of lawyers, business-
men, and publishers named themselves the "League of
150. Beginning at the turn of the century, California and, in particular, Southern
California, was rapidly expanding due to flourishing fruit growers, a dramatic oil
boom, and burgeoning industry-including, most notably, the movie industry. See
id at 4-9. The rapid development resulted in a state population increase of 60%
from 1900 to 1910. See id. at 4-7.
151. Los Angeles at the time had more churches per capita than any similarly
sized city in the nation. See id at 38.
152. See id. at 39. Dr. Haynes's efforts led to the enactment of the initiative in
Los Angeles, years before enacted statewide in 1911. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71,
74, 88 P. 270, 271-72 (1906). See also Persily, supra note 26, at 27-28.
153. See MOWRY, supra note 133, at 62,67.
154. See id. at 40, 66.
155. See id. at 67-68.
156. See id. at 68.
157. See iL at 69.
158. See id
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Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican Clubs.', 159 Through their tireless or-
ganizational efforts, they ultimately elected their own Republican
Governor-Hiram Johnson-and a legislature dedicated to reform.W
In 1911 Governor Johnson called a special election to fulfill his
promise that powerful private interests would never again dominate
state government.' Even if they attempted to do so, California vot-
ers would have at their disposal a way of reining in such abuses-the
power of initiative.' As Justice Tobriner stated, "[t]he amendment
of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the initiative and
referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the pro-
gressive movement of the early 1900's."'1
Direct democracy in California thus traces its roots from the era
of loose Mexican rule, through a demi-republic, military occupation,
statehood, two constitutional conventions, corporate imperialism,
and finally to the seminal election of 1911. It is no exaggeration to
observe that Californians' right of direct legislation is the child of a
long-standing, deeply ingrained mistrust of any instrument of state-
wide governance, particularly targeting the relationship between
state lawmaking representatives and powerful, well-heeled corporate
interests.'
159. See id. at 71.
160. See itL at 135-57.
161. A constitutional amendment adopted in 1902 permitted home rule cities
to amend their charters by initiative. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3(b), (c); see
also HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, TiE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE 223-26 (1916) (noting that the home rule statute was amended six
times, but the 1902 amendment was most significant for the initiative movement).
162. See Reports of the California Constitutional Revision Commission, The
Initiative Process (visited Feb. 22, 1998) <http://library.ca.gov/california/CCRC/
reports/html/bs-initiative-process.html>.
The great legacy of the Progressive Reform Movement in California,
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 22, passed in the Senate on Feb-
ruary 9, 1911 by a vote of thirty-five to one, Senator Leroy A. Wright of
San Diego casting the only dissenting vote. On February 16, the As-sembly passed the amendment with seventy-two votes in favor and no
dissenting votes. Placed before the voters at a special election called by
Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson on October 10, 1911, the peopleratified th  Initiative, Referendum, and Recall constitutional amend-
ment by a vote of 168,744 to 52,093.
Id.163. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Liver-
more, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
164. The sentiment persisted beyond the 1911 changes. Two years later, theSeventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified, provid-
ing for popular election of Senators, rather than selection by state legislatures.
See generally Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast, supra note 108 (discussing the adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment and assessing the consequences of direct elec-
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As the 1911 ballot pamphlet stated in urging Californians to
adopt the initiative:
It is not intended and will not be a substitute for legislation,
but will constitute that safeguard which the people should
retain for themselves to supplement the work of the
legislature by initiating those measures which the legislature
either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to enact; and
to hold the legislature in check, and to veto or negative such
measures as it may viciously or negligently enact."
The amendment passed and California became one of the early
states to allow initiative lawmaking!" Within a few years of its
adoption, however, it became clear that the electorate had unleashed
a monster, at least where achieving an orderly, sensible constitution
was concerned. In 1930, the California Constitutional Commission
established by Governor C. C. Young reported that "constant
amendment" of the organic law had "produced an instrument bad in
form, inconstant in particulars, loaded with unnecessary detail, en-
cumbered with provisions of no permanent value, and replete with
matter which might more properly be contained in the statute law of
the state."' 67
Accordingly, the Commission voted unanimously to cali a consti-
tutional.convention to revise the constitution and perhaps even the
initiative process.'6 The call for a convention was approved by the
voters in 1938, but the legislature failed to comply and no convention
was held.
1 69
The next effort at reform was initiated by Governor Earl Warren
in 1947, but the legislative members of the Interim Commission for
tion).
165. Constitutional Amendment 22, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
SPECIAL ELECTION (Oct. 11, 1911) [hereinafter 1911 CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET] (Comments of Lee C. Gates, Senator, 34th District, and William C.
Clark, Assemblyman, 59th District). For this reason California's strict limits on
legislative amendment of initiatives invests initiative statutes with "quasi-
constitutional" status.
166. Three other states had earlier provided for initiatives: South Dakota in
1898, Utah in 1900, and Oregon in 1902. The initiative process was commonly
called the "Oregon System" for many years. See Schuman, supra note 25, at 948
n.7; see generally MARCH FONG Eu, A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INI-
TIATIVE PROCESS 2 (1988) (discussing both the history of the initiative process
and popular and recent initiatives).
The referendum process originated much earlier in a popular vote author-
ized by the Connecticut Legislature in 1818. See BALDWIN, supra note 108, at 49.
167. Ooley, supra note 93, at n.17 and accompanying text.
168. See id. at n.17.
169. Id. at n.18.
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the Revision of the California Constitution again blocked the call for
a convention."' Various efforts have been mounted since then to
temper the use and misuse of the initiative power, but no meaningful
reforms have occurred.17'
Since its inception, approximately 700 initiatives have been pro-
posed for the California ballot, and over 200 have been submitted to
the voters." Including those proposed by the legislature," over 425
amendments to the 1879 constitution have been adopted. 4 By 1948
the constitution had grown from 7300 words in the original to 95,000
words.'75 "Indeed the facility of change in our Constitution has nur-
tured apprehension that the charter is an inadequate protection
against the possible political excesses and the possible fears or hys-
teria of a temporarily irresponsible electoral majority, against what
170. See id. Legislative resistance was apparently due to their fear of reappor-
tionment of seats, a matter that revision was likely to accomplish. See id.
171. The only significant changes have been the 1962 addition of language al-
lowing the legislature to place "revisions," as well as amendments, before the
voters, and the 1966 deletion of the "indirect initiative." The process adopted in
1911 had originally allowed for both indirect and direct initiatives. The former
gave the legislature an opportunity to enact the proposal as law before it went on
the ballot. This device had been used only four times in fifty years, and only
once successfully. See id.
The indirect initiative may be lost but it is not forgotten. The 1996 Cali-
fornia Constitution Revision Commission reported to the legislature as follows:
The initiative process should not exclude the legislature from the law-
making process. The legislature is a lawmaking body, and it has experi-
ence in making laws and considering their outcomes. The legislature
should-at a minimum-have a role in the initiative process to ensure
that initiatives are well-written and meet the purposes for which they are
designed. Additionally, once an initiative statute is enacted, there
should be a mechanism for evaluating its impact. If an initiative statute
is not meeting its intended purpose, or if it is having unexpected conse-
quences, the legislature and the governor should be able to revise the
law.
CALIFORNIA CONSTrITION REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 30 (1996).
Yet, neither these, nor any other reforms recommended by the Commission,
have been acted upon or put before the voters.
172. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 33,
at 7.
173. Constitutional amendments may be proposed by the legislature as well as
by initiative. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
174. See Ooley, supra note 93.
175. See id at n.16 and accompanying text. It has shrunk somewhat since
then, principally due to the deletion of 14,500 words providing for the San Fran-
cisco Panama-Pacific Exposition. See id. at n.20.
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John Stuart Mill called the 'tyranny of prevailing opinion and feel-
* g.,
' '
176
It would be an understatement to observe that the initiative
process has been transformed since its inception as a means to curb
entrenched politicians and special interests. It is now a favorite tool
of politicians and special interests.' Perhaps it should not be surpris-
ing that the insurance industry spent $88 million dollars on California
initiatives in 1988-more than George Bush spent on his entire
presidential campaign; or that Southern Pacific Railroad-the target
of the 1911 initiative process-has recently sponsored its own ballot
measures.
78
Hiram Johnson would not recognize the electoral device he
begat nearly a century ago. 9 It is the driving force in California
politics and lawmaking. In major policy areas, it has supplanted the
legislature, not checked it," and its dominance is not likely to be un-
dermined any time soon.'
III. THE NATURE OF CALIFORNIA'S INITIATIVE POWER AS
EVIDENCED BY THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION
What is the initiative power? Where does it come from, and
what is its relationship to the other branches of government? We ask
these questions because, so thoroughly did the Federalists triumph,
176. PALMER & SELVIN, supra note 57, at 23.
177. See id. at 26. As the California Supreme Court noted shortly after the
initiative process was adopted, "[i]t is common knowledge that an initiative
measure is originated by some organization or a small group of people." Wallace
v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585,592,254 P. 946,949 (1927); see also Persily, supra note 26,
at 32; Initiatives: Use and Abuse, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1998, at M4 ("[I]t still may
be possible for a true grass-roots movement to rise up and right wrongs through
the ballot box. But the common use of the initiative in California today is for
well-heeled special interests to write their own wishes into state law or the Con-
stitution.").
178. See Peter Schrag, Take the Initiative, Please: Referendum Madness in
California, THE AMERICAN PROSPECr, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 61-63.
179. See id. (stating "[Hiram] Johnson could hardly have imagined how that
device, harnessed to modem campaign technologies, could be used by the very
politicians and interests it was meant to check.").
180. See id
181. Refinements have been proposed, most notably the 1996 California Con-
stitution Revision Commission. However, none of their proposals has been im-
plemented. See supra note 171.
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we are not used to thinking about governance in terms different than
Montesquieu's tripartite model of divided government."2
Under the familiar model, embraced by the federal and most
state constitutions,"' the legislature makes the laws," the executive
branch executes the laws,"' and the judicial branch interprets and
applies the laws.8 Where does the initiative fit in? To arrive at the
answer, one must begin with the text of the California Constitution.
Article H, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All
political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted
for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to
alter or reform it when the public good may require."' '" California's
constitution thus gives a name to the power of self-governance. The
ability of individuals to "create" and regulate government institutions
182. The structure of the federal government is usually traced to two great po-
litical theorists of the 18th century: John Locke and Charles Louis de Secondat,
Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu, or simply "Montesquieu." It was Mon-
tesquieue's masterpiece, The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, which had the
greatest effect on the framers' conception of republican government.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1977) (1748). The Spirit of the Laws was a comparative study of
three types of government: republic, monarchy, and despotism. Montesquieu
preferred the first, particularly because the powers of government could be sepa-
rated in order to ensure individual freedom. See id at 106-25. He noted that lib-
erty could not be preserved where the power to make laws, the power to execute
the laws, and the power to interpret the laws were combined in a single organ of
government. See id. at 117.
183. California's separation of powers principle is even more explicit than its
federal counterpart. See CAL. CoNsT. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state govern-
ment are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of
one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by the Con-
stitution.").
184. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; CAL. CONsr. art. IV, § 1.
185. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; CAL. CoNsr. art. V, § 1.
186. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1. According to Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe:
The upshot is to require, in most instances, that at least two full
branches of the federal government cooperate before governmental
choices potentially hostile to individual rights or needs can be effected.
Passage of a federal law, for example, requires the concurrence of both
Houses of Congress and the agreement of the Executive unless Con-
gress can muster a special bicameral majority to override an executive
veto; enforcement of the law in turn requires cooperation of the Judici-
ary and the Executive but no further action by Congress.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 2-2 (2d ed. 1988)
(citation omitted).
187. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. This clause may have been borrowed from the
proposed (but twice rejected) Iowa Constititution of 1844, which contained
nearly identical language.
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is dubbed the "political power." This is the organic power of a sov-
ereign polity. It has been invoked twice in California, in the 1849 and
1879 conventions.
California's exercise of popular sovereignty mirrors that exer-
cised on the federal level, both in the institutions created and the
powers delegated.1" In both cases the people invoked the political
power not merely to create and limit the institutions of government,
but also to "set bounds to their own power, as against the sudden im-
pulses of mere majorities.'
89
A. Philosophical Origins of the Political Power
The phrase "political power" is best understood as standing for
the same philosophical precepts of legitimate government that moti-
vated our federal constitutional framers to begin their charter with
the words "We the People." John Locke posited an abstraction to
explore the origins of the principle of self-government. Locke was
interested in creating a theory of political justice, one that would
identify and validate the rights of man and property against a poten-
tially tyrannical state.'" He began, as did many philosophers after
him, in a "state of nature," a hypothetical realm where one might ex-
amine such questions as "what is justice" and "what are the legiti-
mate bases for governance of a few over the many" from a theoreti-
cally objective perspective. 91  Locke eventually, and famously,
concluded that legitimate governments derive their authority only
from the consent of those governed.
188. Both the state and federal governments consist of legislative, executive,
and judicial branches. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting legislative power
to Congress); art. II, § 1 (vesting executive power in the President); art. III, § 1
(vesting judicial power in one supreme court), with CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The
powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged
with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as per-
mitted by this Constitution.").
189. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
190. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 100-06 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
191. Locke wrote, "Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins." Id. at 418.
Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right.... When the Governour, how-
ever intituled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; and his Commands and
Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but
the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other ir-
regular Passion.
Id. at 416-17.
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Accordingly, government should be instituted only by and for
the well-being of those govemed.' 92 This may be a commonplace no-
tion today, but it was a radical idea in an era proclaiming the divine
right of kings.'93 Locke's influence is seen throughout this nation's
most hallowed political texts-most prominently in the Declaration
of Independence,"4 but also in the first three words of the preamble
to the Federal Constitution.
192. See id. at 384-85.
193. Locke reasoned that in the state of nature people have natural rights to
their "Lives, Liberties and Estates." Id. at 368. Individuals enter into political
society to preserve and protect those rights and transfer to their society and gov-
ernment only so much of those rights as is necessary to do so. See iL at 368-71.
They agree to allow the majority to make laws for the public good. See id. at 343.
When the government acts to deprive individuals of their natural rights, it"exercis[es] a Power the People never put into [its] hands." Id. at 397. "[Ilt can
never be supposed to be the Will of the Society, that the Legislative should have
a Power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by entering into Soci-
ety...." Id. at 430.
The relevant aspects of Locke's theory of government are as fol-
lows. Locke takes the state of nature as his starting point, and argues
that autonomous individuals, self-ruling as a matter of natural law, vol-
untarily agree to band together into a civil society for their own mutual
security and advantage. As a central feature of this transaction, each
member of the society surrenders his natural right of self-rule to the
collective society. This exchange usually... results in a binding agree-
ment to abide by the will of the majority of the society's members.
... The government, Locke argues, is ... no more than an agent
of the people: it exercises only the powers that have been delegated by
the people, and it exercises them then only in a way that the people have
authorized.
A government duly appointed by the people and acting within the
bounds of its delegated powers is "legitimate"-that is, it has the right,
and not merely the power, to make laws binding on society. Conversely,
a government that has not been appointed by the people, or that ex-
ceeds the scope of its delegated powers-i.e., that exists or acts without
the consent of the governed-is not legitimate.
James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 189, 201-03
(1990) (citations omitted).
194. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). It is also found in
earlier pronouncements, such as the Declaration of Resolves of The First Conti-
nental Congress, Oct. 14, 1774.
That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North America, by the
immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and
the several charters or compacts, have the following Rights: Resolved,
N. C. D. 1. That they are entitled to life, liberty, & property, and they
have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of
either without their consent.
Id., reprinted in 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 67.
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B. From Political Power to Initiative Power
This Article posits that political power is synonymous with sov-
ereignty. It is a power exercised at its most fundamental level only by
the people themselves and not by any institution of lesser delegated
authority. But by what mechanism do the people exercise their sov-
ereignty in a populous society? Can they do so through casual
means, such as plebiscite or referendum? Or must they do so in a
formalized fashion, such as a convention? We believe it is only the
latter.
Crafting the California state government in 1849 was surely an
exercise of popular sovereignty. No formal political structure then
existed-thus resembling, in juridical terms, Locke's state of nature.
Nor was there any official mandate for creating a state.195 In this
sense, the constitutional convention was extra-legal, although not il-
legal, there being no law on the subject. Its authority ultimately de-
rived from several sources. First, it occurred through popular accep-
tance. The people's election of delegates and ultimate ratification of
the constitution, both through election, transmuted a de facto gov-
ernment formation into a de jure one."' Not only had this been dem-
onstrated in Philadelphia in 1787,'9' but it had also been replicated in
the several states.
As the California Supreme Court put it, "the entire sovereignty
of the people is represented in the convention."'198 A leading nine-
teenth century treatise concurred-an assemblage was the only occa-
sion for the exercise of true sovereignty-and traced the theory to the
Teutonics.' 9  "'De minoribus principes consultant: de majoribus
195. See CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1849, at 5 (Cleland ed.,
1949) ("The [1849] convention... was not authorized by Congress, territorial
legislature, or any other recognized authority. It found its sanction in necessity
rather than in law.").
196. See id. at 10 ("Without the sanction of President, Congress, or any other
authority except the decision of its own people, California organized its govern-
ment and set up what virtually amounted to a de facto if not a de jure state.").
197. It should be remembered that the Philadelphia constitutional convention
was also extra-legal, and perhaps illegal, in that the delegates' sole charge was to
recommend amendments to the Articles of Confederation, a charge they ignored
nearly from the first day.
198. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 117, 36 P. 424,426 (1894) ("The charac-
ter and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed from
any limitations other than those contained in the constutitution of the United
States.... [I]t is... the organic law of the state, to which every citizen must yield
an acquiescent obedience.").
199. See BALDWIN, supra note 107, at 259.
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omnes."' "We call upon the people to act only on matters of fun-
damental law. In our constitutional conventions they resume, at long
intervals, for a few weeks' time, their delegated powers, and re-found
the State."'
What then is the relationship between the political power and
the initiative power, both of which appertain to the people? The ini-
tiative power is a subset of the political power, not its equivalent and
not a manifestation of its exercise. Rather, the initiative most closely
resembles one of the constituent elements of the political power-the
legislative power, a facet of the "creative element" of an already
constituted government.2 However, although "[t]he initiative is the
power of the electors to propose [and vote on] statutes and amend-
ments to the Constitution, '" ' it is not identical, either in text or the-
ory, to the same power exercised by the legislature. It is at the same
time both superior and inferior to the legislature's power. It is supe-
rior in the sense that the legislature may not repeal or amend an ini-
tiative statute, unless the enactment so specifies.' 5 It is inferior in
that the legislature may do more than enact laws and constitutional
amendments. For instance, the legislature may pass resolutions, re-
district the state, and call for a federal constitutional convention,
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is vested
in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the
people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum."); Dwyer
v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 513, 253 P. 932, 935 (1927) ("By the enactment of.
initiative and referendum laws the people have simply withdrawn from the legis-
lative body and reserved to themselves the right to exercise a part of their inher-
ent legislative power."). This is true also of the power of initiative and referen-
dum at the local level. See DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 775, 889
P.2d 1019, 1026, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 706 (1995) ("[T]he local electorate's right to
initiative and referendum is guaranteed by the California Constitution, Article II,
section 11, and is generally co-extensive with the legislative power of the local
governing body.") (citation omitted).
203. See Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341, 349 (1858) ("The Legislature being the
creative element in the system, its action cannot be quickened by the other depart-
ments."); Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 70 (1858) ("The legislative power is the
creative element in the government, and was exercised partly by the people in the
formation of the Constitution. It is primarily and original, antecedent and funda-
mental, and must be exercised before the other departments can have anything to
do."); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1033, 1045 (1968) ("Citizen
participation is not simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element
in government and lawmaking.").
204. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 213-19.
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none of which can be done by initiative." The legislature may also
propose revisions to the constitution; an initiative may not.2 Indeed,
"an initiative which seeks to do something other than enact a stat-
ute-which seeks to render an administrative decision, adjudicate a
dispute, or declare by resolution the views of the resolving body-is
not within the initiative power reserved by the people."'
Despite the limitations just noted, the initiative power is still a
close cousin to the political power itself, at least insofar as the same
people who retain the power to create the government in the first
place wield it.2 Indeed, the initiative power is one "reserved" by the
people, not one delegated to them.2 0 This reservation suggests that
the power is an original one, like political power itself. 2 1 On the
other hand, although the people exercise it directly, the initiative
power is still fundamentally a legislative power and therefore subject
to limits, as is government.
The textual bases for the initiative power may thus be summa-
rized as follows: first, all political power is inherent in the people;
second, this political power-the power to make legitimate govern-
ments-has been thrice subdivided, with the initiative being a legis-
lative power; third, while the legislative power is principally dele-
gated to the legislature, the direct exercise of legislative power by
initiative is reserved to the people; and finally, the people who have
reserved the power of initiative are presumably the same people in
whom political power is inherent.
206. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 708, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89,
103 (1984) ("Even under the most liberal interpretation, however, the reserved
powers of initiative and referendum do not encompass all possible actions of a
legislative body."); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 666, 669 P.2d 17,
21, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 785 (1983); Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639
P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982).
207. Compare CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2, with § 3.
208. AFL-CIO, 36 Cal.3d at 714, 686 P.2d at 627,206 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
209. See National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. State of California, 58 Cal. App.
4th 753, 760, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 364 (1997) (stating that constitutional provision
for initiatives rests on theory that all power of government ultimately resides in
the people).
210. See CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, art. IV, § 1.
211. See infra Part V.F.
212. Electors obviously have the same qualifications whether they are exercis-
ing "political power," as in adopting a constitution by convention, or exercising
legislative power, through initiative law-making. Still, "the people's" participa-
tion is greatly different. In adopting our current constitution in 1879, over 90%
of the electorate voted. See SWISHER, supra note 114, at 109 (145,093 votes cast
out of a potential electorate of 161,000). In contrast, initiative elections draw as
few as 36% of the electorate. See Reports of the California Constitutional Revi-
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The question unanswered by either the textual sources for the
initiative power or their philosophical moorings is "so what?" What
are the consequences of the initiative power being a reserved legisla-
tive power, wielded by the same people who have the popular sover-
eignty to alter the entire governmental system? A survey of relevant
case and textual authorities demonstrates that the Lockean notions
that led our framers to describe the initiative legislative power as one
reserved by the people have enormous, real-world repercussions for
ordered California government.
IV. INITIATIVE-IMPOSED LIMITS ON THE POWER OF THE
LEGISLATURE PROVIDE FURTHER DEFINITION OF THE EXTENT AND
NATURE OF THE INITIATIVE POWER
California has long provided that the legislature may not amend
initiative statutes by another statute unless the initiative permits
amendments. 3 In this regard, California is virtually alone among the
twenty-two states that have initiatives. This provision of the consti-
tution reflects both this state's adherence to Lockean precepts and its
profound, deeply rooted historical distrust of statewide governing in-
stitutions. Courts have uniformly explained this provision by refer-
ence to the near sacrosanct role that direct legislation plays in the
California governmental system as a safety valve for direct participa-
tory democracy. 4 For example, in protecting this "precious or fun-
damental right ' 215 from incursion by the legislature, the judiciary pays
little or no deference at all to the legislature's characterizations of
sion Commission, supra note 162.
213. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(C) ("The Legislature... may amend or repeal
an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved
by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without
their approval."). Of the twenty-two states that use the initiative process for stat-
utes, thirteen allow legislative amendment with concurrence of the governor at any
time. See PHILIP L. DuBoIs & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA
INrIATrVE PRocEss: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 44-46 (1992). Other states put minor
limits on legislative enactment, such as a two year moratorium on amendments, or
a super majority vote requirement in the legislature, or both. See id California and
Arizona stand alone at the very end of the spectrum; both require, in the normal
course of events, a popular vote to amend an initiative statute. See id
214. See Huening v. Eu, 231 Cal. App. 3d 766, 777, 282 Cal. Rptr. 664, 671
(1991).
215. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n,
51 Cal. 3d 744, 768, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787, 802 (1990); see, e.g.,
Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688, 695, 889 P.2d 557, 560, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 366
(1995) (quoting Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
591,557 P.2d 473,477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41,45 (1976)).
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whether a statute is or is not really an amendment to an initiative'16 or
whether a re-enactment of a popularly repealed law is different than
the repealed version.217
Ineluctably, this restriction on legislative amendment of initia-
tives means that the people's direct legislative power is greater than
the more indirect exercise of that power by intermediaries such as
elected representatives."' For example, if Californians enact a
sweeping insurance reform initiative that permits no amendments,
the result is effectively to remove from the legislature a portion of its
constitutional power to legislate in the sphere the initiative occupies.
Hypothetically, one can envision a scenario where there is little room
for a legislature at all.219
Looking at the philosophical underpinnings of California's con-
stitution, there can be only one theoretical explanation for this hier-
archy. In California, there exists a sliding scale of legislative power:
the more the exercise of the legislative power resembles the very core
power of self-governance-the closer it gets to the so-called political
power-the greater the exercise of that power will be. As the initia-
tive/legislative power is one reserved by the same people who act as
popular sovereign, a legislative exercise by those people should, logi-
cally, be superior to the exercise of even the same power by a delega-
tee. Likewise, as a near-cousin of the power of popular sovereignty-
the most potent of civil forces-enormous deference should be af-
forded its exercise. Indeed this is exactly how it works in California.
216. See Bartosh v. Board of Osteopathic Exam'rs, 82 Cal. App. 2d 486, 493-94,
186 P.2d 984, 988 (1947).
217. See Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal. App. 2d 115, 120-21, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 311
(1959). The 1911 version of Article II, Section 10(c), the prior Article IV, Section 1,
was even more emphatic, providing in part that:
No act, law or amendment to the Constitution, initiated or adopted by
the people, shall be subject to the veto power of the Governor, and no
act, law or amendment to the Constitution, adopted by the people at the
polls... shall be amended or repealed except by a vote of the electors,
unless otherwise provided in said initiative measure ....
218. See Huening, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 778,282 Cal. Rptr. at 672; Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Cory, 80 Cal. App. 3d 772, 776, 145 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (1978); Bartosh, 82
Cal. App. 2d at 493, 186 P.2d at 988; In re Nose, 195 Cal. 91, 93, 231 P. 561, 562
(1924) (en banc).
219. See DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 786, 889 P.2d 1019, 1033, 38
Cal. Rptr. 699, 713 (1995); Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 699, 889 P.2d at 563, 38 Cal. Rptr. at
369.
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A. The California Supreme Court Avoids a "Constitutional
Armageddon" by Upholding the Electorate's Initiative Power over the
Legislature
The true force of the nearly century-old sliding scale of legisla-
tive powers was put to the test directly for the first time only in 1995
in Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson.' California and Arizona
are alone in their provision for barring any amendments to statutory
initiatives by the legislature.2' However, for nearly as long as Cali-
fornia has had an initiative process, initiative drafters have sought to
balance the mistrust of the legislature-which might have impelled
the initiative proponents to pursue the direct legislativ6 route in the
first place-with a practical recognition that needed technical
amendments should be permitted without having to resort to an ex-
pensive, cumbersome, and unpredictable statewide election. Thus,
for over seventy years, initiative drafters have included language
that permits the legislature to enact a legislative amendment if the
amendment "furthers" the initiative's "purposes." And yet, what if
the legislature enacts an amendment that seeks to frustrate rather
than further the initiative's provisions? If the judiciary stepped in
and declared an amendment unlawful for failing to further the initia-
tive's reforms, why would that not constitute judicial second-guessing
of the policy choices of the legislature as to what does and does not
further a reform-a judicial usurpation of the legislative power?
In Amwest, drafters of Proposition 103 asked the California Su-
preme Court to invalidate a legislative amendment to that initiative
that exempted surety insurance=4 from its price regulation reforms.'
220. 11 Cal. 4th 1243,906 P.2d 1112,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12 (1995).
221. See ARIz. CONST art. 21, § 1; CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10.
222. Defining the first initiative to employ this restriction has proven difficult,
but similar language was subject to judicial interpretation as early as 1924. See In re
Nose, 195 Cal. 91,231 P. 561 (1924).
223. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 33, at 94.
224. Surety insurance is essentially an insurance policy that one party, a princi-
pal, takes out to protect another party, an obligee, against the principal's default or
misperformance of its contractual obligations to the obligee. The surety bond is an
agreement providing for monetary compensation for the obligee should there be a
failure by the principal to perform specified acts within the specified time period.
See ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURANCE HANDBOOK FOR REPORTERS
260 (2d ed. 1985).
225. See Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1249, 906 P.2d at 1115, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
Proposition 103 was a multifaceted property-casualty insurance reform initiative
enacted over an insurer-backed, $88 million opposition campaign in 1988. Its price
regulatory reforms include a rollback of insurance prices to 80% of what they were
the year before the initiative's enactment, and a provision providing for strict prior
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A detailed account of the facts of the litigation provides a modern
day case study of why the constitutional framers may have been jus-
tified in distrusting any significant initiative amendment role for the
legislature. Such an explication likewise demonstrates how courts
and advocates have struggled to describe the initiative power's pre-
cise features against a backdrop of the more familiar tripartite model
of representative government.
Section 8 of Proposition 103, uncodified, contained a provision
that allowed the legislature to amend the initiative upon a two-thirds
vote, but only when such an amendment "further[ed] its purposes.""u6
The day after Proposition 103 passed, a group of surety insurers filed
suit in the Los Angeles Superior Court in part on the grounds that
surety insurance should not be included in Proposition 103-even
though the initiative unambiguously covered surety insurance.' The
superior court rejected Amwest's request for a judge-made exemp-
tion.m
The surety industry then took its case to the legislature, which
unanimously enacted AB 3798 on consent calendar.n9 The bill would
have exempted the $515 million surety insurance industry"o from
Proposition 103's price control reforms."l The bill claimed that ex-
empting the industry from Proposition 103 furthered the initiative's
approval review of any requested insurance rate increases. See CAL. INS. CODE §§
1861.01, 1861.05 (West 1993).
226. 1988 Cal. Stat. A-290.
227. See Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, No. C704879, at 3 (L.A. Sup. Ct.
1991). The initiative's broad scope encompassed auto insurance, homeowner's in-
surance, and surety insurance, among others, and is set forth in Insurance Code
section 1861.13 which provides that Proposition 103 applies "to all insurance on
risks or operations in this state, except those listed in section 1851." CAL. INS.
CODE § 1861.13 (West 1993). Like automobile and homeowner's insurance, surety
insurance is not exempted in section 1851. See Uet § 1851. Thus, surety, like all
other kinds not listed, is subject to the initiative's reforms.
228. See Vogel Minute Order, Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, No.
C704879 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1990). Based on its finding that Proposition 103 applied to
surety insurers, the superior court ruled that any relief sought from Proposition
103's provisions must be made through the administrative process set forth in the
initiative. See id. The court noted that "the fact remains that there is no exemption
for surety rates" under Proposition 103. Id. Resolution of this statutory question
was all that remained in the litigation because the California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Calfarm v. Deukmejian mooted the surety insurers' constitutional claims,
See Calfarm v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 285 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1989).
229. See Amwest, No. C704879, at 5.
230. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 122ND ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 267 (1989).
231. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.135(a) (repealed 1988).
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purpose by clarifying its application-or non-application-to sure-
ties.
The proponents of Proposition 103 intervened in the pending
superior court action and challenged the validity of the exemption.z2
The courte3 applied the usual deferential standard of review for legis-
lation and ruled that the amendment violated neither the California
Constitution nor the terms of Proposition 103.' The court wrote,
"[T]he Legislature's power to amend or repeal [an initiative] is ple-
nary."
' 5
The court of appeal reversed, 6 and the California Supreme
Court sustained its decision.' The key issue was the standard of re-
view. The industry argued that any level of review more stringent
than rational basis would lead to a "constitutional Armageddon,"
whereby the courts would be substituting their judgments for those of
the legislature. 8 The initiative's proponents, joined by the Depart-
ment of Insurance, argued that independent review was required.239
They argued that, since under Article II, Section 10(c), Californians
had the right to bar amendments outright, they also possessed the
lesser included power to limit the legislature's amending authority.24
In other words, the court owed deference not to the judgment of the
legislature, but to that of the people, as expressed in the initiative."
The Supreme Court agreed:
In enacting lAB 3798] the Legislature did not purport to
interpret the Constitution, but only to amend the statutory
provisions enacted by Proposition 103. The issue before us
is whether the Legislature exceeded its authority. The "rule
of deference to legislative interpretation" of the California
Constitution, therefore, has no application in the present
case. 
24
232. See Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1250, 906 P.2d 1112 at 1116, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
16.
233. Judge Miriam Vogel presided over the first trial, but was replaced by
Judge Janavs when the former was elevated to the court of appeal.
234. See Amwest, No. C704879, at 6.
235. It at 5-6.
236. See Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 40 Cal. App. 4th 225, 241, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 611, 620 (1993).
237. See Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1268,906 P.2d at 1128,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
238. See id. at 1251, 906 P.2d at 1116, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
239. See U
240. See id.
241. See id at 1254, 906 P.2d at 1119, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
242. Id. at 1253, 906 P.2d at 1118, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. Recall that Article II,
June 1998] 1201
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1165
The court then drew an analogy to cases where the legislature is
called into special session and enacts legislation that exceeds the
subject matter of the call.' 4 While any restriction on the power of the
legislature must be "strictly .construed," and thus all intendments in-
ured in favor of upholding the enactment," when the people exercise
their right under Article II, Section 10(c), the court must determine
whether an act "furthers" an initiative's purposes or subverts them. 45
In Amwest the California Supreme Court held that AB 3798 did not
"further the purposes" of Proposition 103, and it declared the statute
unlawful.
2"
Amwest thus establishes that the electorate's legislative power is
constitutionally superior to the legislature's exercise of the same
power. The case stands for the proposition that a searching judicial
scrutiny will be applied to those statutes that do not otherwise spark
heightened review when those statutes are amendments to initiatives.
B. Judicial Enforcement of California's Sliding Scale Power
Relationship Does Not Violate Other Constitutional Values, Most
Notably the Separation of Powers
As observed previously, it appears that in California's constitu-
tional scheme, the closer one gets to the exercise of the core political
power, the more definitive-and therefore powerful-the expression
of governing will is. Despite Amwest, it may be argued that a judi-
cially enforced hierarchy between the initiative power and the legisla-
ture practically, if not theoretically, violates the separation of powers.
That question was answered in two of California's landmark initiative
Section 10(c), of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[The legis-
lature] may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes
effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits
amendment or repeal without their approval." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(C).
243. See Amwest, 11 Cal. 4th at 1254-55, 906 P.2d at 1119-20, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 18-19.
244. Id. at 1255, 906 P.2d at 1119, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
245. See Ud at 1268-69, 906 P.2d at 1128, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
246. See id at 1265, 906 P.2d at 1126, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 26. Similarly, in DeVita v.
County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 889 P.2d 1019, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (1995), the su-
preme court ruled on the validity of an initiative that placed formidable restrictions
on the city council's ability to alter a general plan currently in effect. See id. at 799,
889 P.2d at 1042,38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. Once more, the California Supreme Court
directed those who disliked the initiative back to the people directly, thereby once
again reaffirming that the people's legislative power is simply greater and more ex-
pansive than the same power exercised by elected officials. See id.
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law cases, In re Pfahler"7 and Associated Home Builders v. Liver-
more.2  In light of the holding in Amwest, these two cases fill in key
doctrinal gaps about the contours and source of the initiative power
in relation to the other powers in our system of governance.
In Pfahler the California Supreme Court considered a challenge
to the then-new Los Angeles City Charter, specifically, the amend-
ment to the Charter providing for ordinances to be enacted directly
via initiative.249 Petitioners argued, inter alia, that Los Angeles's ini-
tiative amendment to the City Charter violated Article XI, Section 11
of the California Constitution because it allegedly "interfere[d]
with and suspend[ed] the exercise of the police power" granted by
the state to the city council."' Rejecting that argument, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that "[t]he [initiative] amendment does not
purport to restrict or suspend in the slightest degree the exercise of
the police power vested in the municipality."' 2 Rather, the initiative
amendment detailed "the manner of [the police power's] exercise.
' '
21
The California Supreme Court explained:
The rule against the suspension of the police power invoked
by petitioner means no more than that the power is a
continuous one, reposed somewhere, and one that cannot
be barred or suspended by contract or irrepealable law, and
never has been held to mean that a law enacted in the
exercise of the police power must ever be open to
instantaneous alteration [by the City Council].'
The court further stated:
The claim that the power to make police regulations upon a
subject covered by an ordinance adopted by the people is
taken from the city by the adoption of such ordinance finds
its source in the erroneous assumption, which is the basis of
247. 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906).
248. 18 Cal. 3d 582,557 P.2d 473,135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
249. See Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 74, 88 P. at 272.
250. That provision of the constitution provided that "[a] county, city, town, or
township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." CAL. CONST. of 1879,
art. XI, § 11. Through this section, the people of California "have made a direct
constitutional grant of the police power of the state to every municipal corporation
for local purposes." Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 80, 88 P. at 274 (quoting Denninger v. Re-
corder's Court, 145 Cal. 629, 631, 79 P. 360, 361 (1904)).
251. Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 84, 88 P. at 276.
252. Id at 85,88 P. at 276.
253. Id-
254. IM
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many of petitioner's arguments, that the city council is the
"city."15
Thus, for example, in Amwest, the insurer's argument that inde-
pendent judicial review of AB 3798, pursuant to the dictates of sec-
tion 8(b) of Proposition 103, inappropriately usurps the legislative
power is based upon the erroneous premise that circumscribing the
state legislature's power is the same as circumscribing the legislative
power.5 Application of independent review to an initiative amend-
ment does not mean that the statute can never be enacted-such a
result would truly circumscribe the legislative power. Rather, invali-
dating such an amendment simply would mean that "the matter" of
the amendment "has been removed from the forum of the
[legislature] to the forum of the electorate." The offending
amendment would have to be enacted or defeated by the people ex-
ercising the direct and paramount legislative power, rather than by
the legislature ostensibly exercising its conditioned, delegated
amending power.
Rossi v. Brown 8 employs similar reasoning. In Rossi the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the San Francisco County electorate
may lawfully repeal a tax ordinance directly employing their legisla-
tive power of initiative.29 In so holding, the court expressly disap-
proved of long relied upon dicta from Campen v. Greiner,26 in which
the appellate court ruled that the legislative powers of a city's elec-
torate were no greater than the same powers of a local city council.
21
In disapproving Campen the California Supreme Court observed:
The Campen court overlooked a fundamental aspect of the
initiative power. . . . The people's reserved power of
initiative is greater than the power of the legislative body.
The latter may not bind future Legislatures, but by
constitutional and charter mandate, unless an initiative
measure expressly provides otherwise, an initiative measure
may be amended or repealed only by the electorate. Thus,
255. Id at 85-86, 88 P. at 276.
256. See Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal. 4th 1243, 1253-55, 906 P.2d
1112, 1116-19,48 Cal. Rptr. 12,16-19 (1995).
257. Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505,516,253 P. 932,936 (1927).
258. 9 Cal. 4th 688, 889 P.2d 557,38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (1995).
259. See id. at 714, 889 P.2d at 573, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
260. 15 Cal. App. 3d 836,93 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1971).
261. See id.
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through exercise of the initiative power the people may bind
future legislative bodies other than the people themselves. 2
The latter italicized portion is key and strikingly similar to
Pfahler. So long as the people do not, by an exercise of their legisla-
tive power, restrict both their own legislative power and the legisla-
ture's, restricting the legislature's power does not operate to restrict
the legislative power at all. It still exists unencumbered in the elec-
torate, who can enact directly what the legislature cannot.
This has somewhat of an awkward result for those used to di-
chotomous legal worlds consisting only of statutes and constitutional
provisions or statutes of differing jurisdictions. In California, it
seems, some statutes are more equal than others. Initiative stat-
utes-enacted by the same sovereign, identical in every respect if
side-by-side in a code book-are nevertheless more equal than stat-
utes enacted by the legislature.
This was the holding in Associated Home Builders v. Liver-
more.'63 In Livermore the California Supreme Court considered the
lawfulness of a local initiative that prohibited any further residential
building until the completion of certain sewage and school improve-
ments.' Under California's Government Code certain notice and
hearing requirements had to be followed before land use and other
zoning changes such as those enacted by the initiative could go into
effect. 5 Thus, the court had to grapple with the question of whether
the local initiative was invalid because the local initiative, by its very
nature, could not comply with those state law notice and hearing re-
quirements.'
In considering this issue, the court had to address its prior ruling
in Hurst v. Burlingame,' in which it reasoned that the people acting
directly only had as much-or as little-legislative power as the legis-
lative body; in this case, the city council.' Therefore, the Hurst court
reasoned, if the city council could not do it, the people could not do it
262. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 715-16, 889 P.2d at 574, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380
(citations omitted) (third emphasis added).
263. 18 Cal. 3d 582,557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
264. See id. at 589, 557 P.2d at 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
265. See id at 590-91, 557 P.2d at 476-77, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
266. See id. at 590, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
267. 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929). Hurst analyzed the validity of an initiative
regulating the location of residences and businesses, which was in conflict with the
Zoning Act of 1917. See id
268. See id. atl41,277P.at311.
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either.29 The Livermore court took the extraordinary step of forth-
rightly and self-consciously overruling Hurst.2° Recognizing that
such a rule as applied to Livermore would mean that the city council
could enact zoning changes, but the people could not, the Livermore
court decried Hurst's decree of inequality in the name of equality.Vl
Having said as much, the court deftly avoided having to strike the
government code notice and hearing requirements by interpreting
them as not applying to initiatives.m2
V. UPHOLDING THE "PRECIOUS RIGHT" OF INITIATIVE-THE
JUDICIARY'S RELUCTANCE TO ENFORCE CONSTITUTIONAL-BASED
LIMITS ON THE INITIATIVE POWER
The judiciary's efforts to safeguard the initiative power are not
limited to statute versus statute or legislature versus electorate con-
frontations. In virtually every case where there might be a constitu-
tional limit on the people's direct legislative power, courts have nar-
rowly construed that limit as to preserve as much legislative
discretion as possible for the electorate.2i In keeping with the initia-
tive's proximity to the most elemental of governmental powers,
courts in California will do virtually whatever it takes to avoid strik-
ing an initiative. '
269. See id. at 141-42, 277 P. at 311.
270. See Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 588,557 P.2d at 475,135 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
271. See id. at 593-94, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47. Any doubt as to the
people's ability to directly affect zoning changes or land use decisions of local
agencies was definitively put to rest in the California Supreme Court's decision in
DeVita v. County of Napa, in which the court held that the people's initiative power
encompasses the ability to place meaningful restrictions on a local agency's future
ability to revise land use elements and zoning in a general plan. See Devita v.
County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 770-71, 889 P.2d 1019, 1023, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699,
703 (1995).
272. See Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 593,557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
273. It is important to observe that of all the so-called limits on the initiative
power discussed in this Article, only one affects the way an initiative can be pre-
sented to the people-the prohibition against initiatives embracing more than a
single subject. See CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 8(d). The people being without the power
to enact initiatives embracing more than one subject, if this limit is violated, the en-
tire initiative fails. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 245, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
35, 651 P.2d 274, 279 (1982). All of the other limits appearing in the constitution
and discussed here--statewide concern, and distinctions between revi-
sion/amendment, administrative/legislative, and referenduminitiative-are simply
restrictions on the types of initiatives that can be enacted in the first place. See also
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12 (prohibiting an initiative from naming a person or corpo-
ration).
274. There are some things that the legislature may do that the people exercis-
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A. The Single Subject Rule Has Been Construed so Broadly as to be a
Virtual Nullity
As many commentators have notedn2 the "single subject rule" in
California has devolved into a virtual nullity; it is a rule with few, if
any, teeth. Under Article II, Section 8(d) of the California Constitu-
tion, initiative measures must be limited to a single subject. 6 In
ing their initiative power cannot, but those differences are inconsequential here.
For example, because the people's initiative power is solely the power to legis-
late, it does not reach the enactment of resolutions. Thus, in AFL-CIO v. Eu the
court held that under Article II, Section 8(a) of the California Constitution, the
initiative power applied only to statutes and amendments. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 714,
686 P.2d 609, 618, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 101 (1984). The court refused to permit a
resolution calling for a balanced federal budget on the ballot. See id. Presuma-
bly in the same vein, the electorate could not present honorary certificates to
noteworthy citizens, hold hearings, or perform any of the other non-legislative
tasks expected of our legislature.
Similarly, where other state constitutional provisions circumscribe the legis-
lature power, those rules apply with equal force to direct legislation. Thus, in
Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983),
the court held that the constitutional restrictions regarding the timing of reap-
portioment applied to direct as well as indirect legislation.
These authorities simply reinforce the conclusion that the initiative power is
a power to enact legislation, albeit an unusually potent version of that power.
These authorities also more broadly reinforce the preeminent supremacy of the
political power, insofar as the constitutional provisions that bind direct and indi-
rect legislation alike were enacted pursuant to this ultimate, government-making
authority, supreme even to the initiative power.
275. See, e.g., Marilyn E. Minger, Putting the "Single" Back in the Single-Subject
Rule: A Proposal for Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 879
(1991) (noting that the single subject rule has become a virtual nullity); Initiative
Bloat, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 24, 1998, at B4 ("Because timid courts have failed
to enforce the constitutional requirement that initiatives deal with only one subject,
too many of the measures that reach the ballot are overly complicated omnibus
measures.").
276. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). California courts and commentators have
elucidated three reasons for the single subject rule. First, it prevents initiative
drafters from "log rolling"-putting unrelated provisions in an initiative that might
attract the support of some disparate interest groups. Second, the single subject
rule exists in order to prevent voter confusion as to exactly what one is voting for.
See John C. Barker, Constitutional Privacy Rights in the Private Workplace, Under
the Federal and California Constitutions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1107, 1162
(1992). This rule recognizes that while there is the fiction that the voters, like legis-
lators, are aware of the contents of legislation, that, in fact, where initiatives are
concerned, votes are likely to be cast on the basis of sound-bites and electioneering.
For example, if an initiative provision involves dog track racing, the regulation of
boxing, and insurance reform, the campaign on its behalf might focus on only the
insurance reform facets of the initiative, thus deluding the voters into believing that
the initiative's entire scope embraced only the insurance reform. Third and finally,
the single subject rule prevents the dilution of votes. See Minger, supra note 275, at
896. Without such a rule, the outcome of initiative elections may not turn with a
voter's agreement on a particular issue, but only an overall agreement with most of
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Brosnahan v. Brown the California Supreme Court held that so
long as the various portions of an initiative were "reasonably ger-
mane" to the topic generally embraced by the initiative, the single
subject rule is satisfied. 8 In so holding, the court rejected the theory,
pressed by the dissent in that case, that the single subject rule ought
to demand that all of the provisions of an initiative be somehow
"interdependent" upon one another, creating a single clock-like
mechanism. 9
The court settled upon the "reasonably germane" standard and
rejected any more stringent application of the constitutional rule ex-
pressly because the courts view it as their role to "'jealousy guard"'
the exercise of the initiative power.' There is one primary reason
why, both abstractly and in application, the single subject rule has so
few teeth. The courts define "subject" very broadly. Essentially, the
courts will abide by any subject that is one quantum more specific
than "doing good." "Criminal justice" and "insurance reform," for
example, have been subjects specific enough for the California Su-
preme Court to satisfy the single subject rule." The Brosnahan court
also expressly equates the "object" of an initiative with the
"subject." m Thus, so long as the court can identify a single over-
arching aim to an initiative-its object-the single subject rule is sat-
isfied.'
B. The Referendum/Initiative Distinction Has Been Eliminated
In Rossi the California Supreme Court held that the electorate
of San Francisco County may lawfully repeal a tax ordinance directly,
employing their legislative power of initiative even when they could
not have lawfully accomplished the same repeal by referendum' 4
the topics addressed in the initiative. See id. at 885-93.
277. 32 Cal. 3d 236,651 P.2d 274,186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
278. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 245,651 P.2d at 279,186 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
279. See id. at 248-51, 651 P.2d at 281-83, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37-39.
280. Id. at 262,651 P.2d at 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
281. See generally id, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (upholding
the "Victim's Bill of Rights," Proposition 8 on June 1982 primary election ballot);
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1989) (upholding insurance regulation initiative, Proposition 103 on November
1988 election ballot); Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-
Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983) (discussing the various tests used to de-
termine whether a proposition meets the single subject rule).
282. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 277,651 P.2d at 299, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
283. See i. at 245, 651 P.2d at 279,186 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
284. See Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688,693, 889 P.2d 557,559, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
363,365 (1995).
1208
THE INITIATIVE POWER
The question in that case was whether Article II, Section 9 of the
California Constitution, which prohibited the repeal by referendum
of a tax ordinance for the usual expenses of the state, meant that the
people similarly could not repeal a tax ordinance by initiative.'
Again, the court sided with an expansive reading of the initiative
power. It held that, despite the fact that permitting a repeal of a tax
ordinance by initiative would, as a practical matter, eviscerate the
constitution's prohibition against the repeal of such ordinances by
referendum, the people nevertheless had such initiative power.'
Here, the supreme court chose, in essence, to open up a giant loop-
hole in the constitutional restriction upon referendum rather than
remove a sphere of initiative lawmaking-repeal of taxes-from the
electorate.
C. The Supreme Court's Deferential Test for Severability, While
Serving to Uphold Initiatives, Can Nonetheless Frustrate Voter Intent
Nowhere is the California Supreme Court's determination to up-
hold the will of the electorate more evident than in its test for severabil-
ity. Most initiatives include a so-called "severability" clause; that is, a
provision that empowers the courts to sever the lawful portions of an ini-
tiative from the unlawful.2m California courts use a three-part test for
determining severability: the lawful provisions must be grammatically,
functionally and volitionally severable from the invalid provisions to sur-
vive.2m
Grammatical severability and functional severability are exactly
that-if the surviving portion of a law reads sensibly and works-absent
the invalid portion-it will be severed. Volitional severability essentially
asks the question, "if the voters could have foreseen the invalidation of
285. See id.
286. See id. at 711-14, 889 P.2d at 571-73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377-79.
287. A typical severability clause might read as follows:
"If any provision of this act, or the application of any such provision to
any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this
act to the extent it can be given effect, or the application of those provi-
sions to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held
invalid, shall not be affected thereby, and to this end the provisions of
this act are severable."
This example is drawn from Proposition 73, discussed in text. See Gerken v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 4th 707, 713, 863 P.2d 694, 698, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d 449, 453 (1993).
288. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 821, 258 Cal. Rptr.
161, 771 P.2d 1247 (1989).
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some of the initiative, would they still have voted for it?"2' This inquiry
is an effort to uncover and preserve the will of the electorate. In actual
application, however, it can subvert that will in the name of upholding the
initiative power.
Such a counter-intuitive result occurred in Gerken v. Fair Political
Practices Commission.2 0 There, the California Supreme Court consid-
ered how to mediate the results of the 1988 election in which two compet-
ing campaign finance reform measures were approved by the voters.
Both Propositions 68 and 73 imposed contribution limitations on candi-
dates, although they differed somewhat in scope and detail. The most
significant difference was that Proposition 68 provided partial state fund-
ing of elections, while Proposition 73 prohibited public funding and state-
paid political mailings.291
Where two or more competing measures are approved by the vot-
ers at the same election, the initiative receiving the greatest number of
votes prevails.2 2 Proposition 73 received more votes than Proposition 68.
Accordingly, in Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political
Practices Commission,293 the court held the latter inoperative. A problem
arose, however, when in Service Employees International v. Fair Political
Practices Commissionn, the Ninth Circuit substantially invalidated the
guts of Proposition 73 as unconstitutionally favoring incumbent legisla-
tors. 24 After that ruling, the proponents of Proposition 68 petitioned the
California Supreme Court to revive their initiative, arguing that, for all
intents and purposes, Proposition 73 was no longer in effect. 295
In Gerken, the court refused to revive Proposition 68. It held that
so long as any portion of Proposition 73 remained effective, that initiative
would still trump Proposition 68, even if what remained of the former
was relatively insubstantial.296 In order to reach this result, the court had
to first sever the invalid portions of Proposition 73 from the remainder of
the initiative. It held that all three elements-grammatical, functional,
and volitional severability-were met.
289. Gerken, 6 Cal. 4th at 714, 863 P.2d at 698, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453.
290. 6 Cal. 4th 707,863 P.2d 694,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 449 (1993).
291. See UL at 711, 863 P.2d at 696, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d at 451.
292. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b) ("when two or more measures are competing
initiatives.... only the provisions of the measure receiving the highest number of
affirmative votes [can] be enforced").
293. 51 Cal.3d 744,799 P.2d 1220,274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
294. 955 F.2d 1312 (1992).
295. See Gerken, 6 Cal.4th at 710,863 P.2d at 697-98,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
296. See id at 711, 863 P.2d at 698, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
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The court held that that so long as the electorate's attention was
'sufficiently focused' on the remaining, valid provisions, it would con-
clusively presume that the electorate preferred this "half a loaf" over the
entirety of the other, less popular, initiative. 297 The court reasoned that
since the initiative's ban on incumbents' self-promotional mailings was
mentioned conspicuously in the ballot pamphlet, the provision was voli-
tionally severable. And since this "substantial" provision of Proposition
73 remained, it was as if the Proposition itself remained valid, i.e., was
itself a complete expression of legislative will that would, even in its
truncated form, trump the opposing Proposition 68.298
Justice Arabian's blistering dissent9 observed that the court's re-
sult ironically left Californians with virtually nothing, despite having
voted twice in the same election for meaningful campaign finance reform.
In response, the majority pointed to Proposition 73's severability clause,
explaining that the result was required by the plain language of the sever-
ability clause. According to the majority, a severability clause represents
a legislative dictate, as deserving of deference as the substantive portions
of an initiative!" Failure to apply broadly such a savings clause, even to
the exclusion of a more practically satisfying result, would violate the
court's traditional deference to winning initiatives. 301
This result surely represents the doctrinal apotheosis-the dissent
would say the doctrinal ad absurdum reductio-of the California Supreme
Court's deference to popularly enacted legislation. So deferential is the
court to every word, and every expression of legislative will of the elec-
torate that such deference actually can serve to impede achieving the vot-
ers' substantive objectives.
D. The Administrative/Legislative Distinction Has Been Abandoned
Yet another example of the California judiciary's desire to uphold
direct legislation can be seen from its efforts to reduce the application of the
so-called "administrative/legislative" restriction on the referendum in favor
297. Id. at 715, 863 P.2d at 702, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454.
298. Id. at 717, 863 P.2d at 700-02, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 ("we can resolve this
litigation by finding that at least one substantial part of Proposition 73 is sever-
able and operative").
299. See id. at 725, 863 P.2d at 706, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Arabian, J., dissent-
ig) ("I dissent from a result that reduces to such an anemic state the exercise of
the powers of initiative and referendum.").
300. See id. at 719 n.10, 863 P.2d at 702 n.10, 25 Cal.Rptr. at 457 n.10.
301. Id.
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of an analysis of whether a local initiative is preempted by superior state
law.0
As the referendum is a legislative power, California courts have held
that any referendum-or, by extension, any initiative-that seeks to exercise
executive regulatory power is beyond the ability of the electorate. Courts
have likewise expressed a practical concern that interference by the elec-
torate in executive functions would be inimical to orderly governance. 3 3
However, uncertainty arises when trying to differentiate between an
action that is "legislative" and an action that is "executive" in character.
In McKevitt v. Sacramento,0' the California Court of Appeal held that there
was a two-part test for legislation. Legislation must (1) declare a public
purpose and (2) declare a means for implementing that purpose. 5 In con-
trast, the court set out a three-part test for administrative actions: (1) pre-
existing legislative policies and purposes must be evident; and (2) the ac-
tions must be necessary to carry out those pre-existing policies or purposes;
or (3) an administrative action must be one that "devolve[s]" upon it,
meaning that the entity exercising the power does so by the "organic law of
its existence."3
The problem in distinguishing between legislative and administrative
enactments is especially acute in cases where a local initiative is challenged
as unlawfully impairing the operation of a superior state law that has dele-
gated certain powers to a local governing body, such as a city council.
When the local governing body moves to fulfill this state-imposed duty, and
the local electorate moves to overrule the action, should a court try and
302. See Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950), discussed infra
notes 308-314 and accompanying text.
303. See Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 611, 150 P.
977, 979 (1915) ("[t]he public discussion which led to the adoption of the referen-
dum [process in the city charter] shows that it was directed at the supposed evils of
legislation alone. To allow it to be invoked to annul or delay executive conduct
would destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the busi-
ness affairs of the City.").
304. 55 Cal. App. 117,203 P. 132 (1921).
305. See id. at 124,203 P. at 136.
306. IL at 124,203 P. at 136. While it is impossible to concretely define the third
prong of the administrative test, the most likely interpretation is that this is a refer-
ence to the inherent powers of regulatory agencies to administer the quasi-
legislative or quasi-adjudicatory functions conveyed to them. "[R]ather, '[i]t is well
settled in this state that [administrative] officials may exercise such additional pow-
ers as are necessary for the due and efficient administration of powers expressly
granted by statute, or as may fairly be implied from the statute granting the pow-
ers."' Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 824-25,771 P.2d at 1258,258 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (quoting
Rich Vision Ctr., Inc. v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 144 Cal. App. 3d 110, 114,192 Cal.
Rptr. 455, 457 (1983) quoting Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d
796, 810,151 P. 2d 505 (1944)).
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divine whether the elected body's action is administrative in character, and
thus a referendum to overrule it is an impermissible effort by the electorate
to exercise administrative power? Or, should the court view the case as
simply about state preemption?
In Simpson v. Hite a proposed 1950 initiative would have repealed
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors' resolution designating a
certain site for a courthouse, and designated another site instead." Initia-
tive proponents wanted only a single building for all criminal, civil, and li-
brary functions; the board of supervisors, however, approved three differ-
ent sites.3 Simpson represents a transitional step in the California courts'
merging of administrative/legislative cases and cases involving a local ini-
tiative trammeling an area of statewide concern.
In adjudicating the lawfulness of the initiative, the court recognized
that under state law the various county boards of supervisors are required to
find "'suitable quarters'" for courts. 30 The court inferred from this com-
mandment that "the state has acted to establish the basic policy [regarding
courthouse placement] and has vested the responsibility for carrying out
that policy in a board of supervisors."311 The court further held: "It would
be beyond the powers of a board of supervisors to repeal or amend the
state-declared policy; likewise, it is beyond the powers of the electorate of
Los Angeles County by initiative procedure to repeal or amend such state
policy."
312
One way to view the court's holding is that the state had vested sole
administrative power to determine the location of courthouses in the county
boards of supervisors. 3 3 However, this case is most frequently cited for the
proposition that a local initiative cannot impinge upon an area of statewide
concern.31 4 Thus, another way to view the case is that the state had re-
moved from localities the discretion to determine who gets to make the final
decision on courthouse placement. 5 In other words, the state has made its
wishes clear as to who ought to have the final word-the county board of
supervisors, and not the electorate.
307. 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950).
308. See id. at 127, 222 P.2d at 226.
309. See id. at 127 n.1, 222 P.2d at 226 n.1.
310. Id. at 127, 222 P.2d at 226-27.
311. Id. at 130, 222 P.2d at 228.
312. Id at 131,222 P.2d at 229.
313. See L at 131, 222 P.2d at 229.
314. See, e.g., DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 776, 889 P.2d 1019,
1026, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 706 (1995).
315. See, e.g., Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754
P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988) (holding that the local initiative was invalid be-
cause it addressed a matter of statewide concern).
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As the cases demonstrate, California courts have inconsistently ap-
plied the often confusing distinction between administrative and legislative
functions.316 The problem may have been solved in Committee of Seven
Thousand v. Superior Court, 17 in which the California Supreme Court
seems to have rejected the doctrine altogether as unworkable. The court
signaled its displeasure with the administrative/legislative distinction and its
preference for a more clear-cut statewide concern analysis. "In explaining
why the Legislature may bar local initiatives in matters of statewide con-
cern, courts have sometimes resorted to an awkward and confusing charac-
terization of the delegated power as 'administrative."' 318 The court con-
cluded that "this use of an administrative characterization [i.e., in a case of
316. In Hopping v. City Council of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915),
the city council refused to submit to the voters a referendum overruling certain of
the council's appropriation resolutions for the purchase of land and construction of
a new city hall. The trial court held the council's resolutions were administrative in
character, and consequently not subject to referendum. The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding land use regulation is traditionally a legislative matter and,
accordingly, that the referendum was a proper exercise of the legislative power. See
id. at 612-13, 150 P. at 980, 982.
A court of appeal decision, purporting to follow Hopping, came to a different
conclusion on similar facts. In McKevitt v. Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 203 P. 132
(1921), William Land gave $250,000 to the city of Sacramento for a public park to
be named after him. See id. at 120, 203 P. at 134. Land's will granted the mayor
and the city council authority to spend the money to procure the park and in-
structed that any left over money be used for "equipping" the park. Id. at 120, 203
P. at 134. The plaintiffs, as option holders of several contiguous parcels of land
belonging to various individuals, offered to convey to the city certain parcels. See
id. at 120, 203 P. at 134. The city accepted the offer and the plaintiffs exercised
their option. See iL at 121, 203 P. at 134. Thereafter, the city submitted a referen-
dum to the voters asking them to repeal the city's resolution of acceptance of the
offer. See id. The voters rejected the land offer at the election.
Not to be defeated, city officials then passed a different resolution which pro-
vided that the funds donated by Mr. Land be spent to reimburse the city for the
purchase and improvement of a nearby park called Del Paso Park. See id. They
would spend any remaining money on obtaining other parks which, not coinciden-
tally, included the original parcel accepted by the city and offered by the option
holders that the voters had rejected. See id. Citizens of the city challenged the ac-
tion as contrary to the referendum, and the California Supreme Court faced the
question of whether the purchase of the park was an exercise of an administrative
power or an exercise of the legislative power, properly subject to referendum. See
id. at 123, 203 P. at 135. The court defined the legislative power as "[a]cts consti-
tuting a declaration of public purpose, and making provision for ways and means of
its accomplishment." Id. at 124, 203 P. at 136. In contrast, the court characterized
administrative acts as "those which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative
policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body, or such as are de-
volved upon it by the organic law of its existence." Id. at 124, 203 P. at 136.
317. 45 Cal. 3d 491,754 P.2d 708,247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988).
318. Id. at 511,754 P.2d at 720, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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a local initiative challenged as impairing state authority] for delegated pow-
ers is an unnecessary fiction."
319
It may be inferred that part of the reason why California courts em-
phasize a statewide concern analysis over an administrative/legislative dis-
tinction analysis is that the latter distinction can be very elusive and, by its
uncertainty, such a test poses a greater threat to initiatives than application
of the comparatively straight-forward statewide concern test.
Indeed, the only clear cut areas in California where one could make
a dependable legislative/administrative distinction are those few circum-
stances where a superior power is wielded by the state and inferior power is
wielded by the local and municipal governments, but even then, such a case
could more easily be resolved by a statewide concern analysis. Thus, it
seems that at least part of what motivates the judiciary to avoid the adminis-
trative/legislative thicket is its self-professed role as the "jealous guardian"
of direct legislation 2m
E. The Judiciary Will "Reform" Initiatives
Another example of the radical lengths that the California courts
will go to uphold initiatives is seen in Kopp v. Fair Political Practices
Commission.n1 Here, the court held that the judiciary may go so far
as to rewrite the actual text of an initiative if it can do so with confi-
dence, knowing that the electorate would have wanted the rewrite.'
The posture of the case is complicated. In 1988 the voters en-
acted Proposition 73, which was intended to reform campaign finance
laws.3' The Ninth Circuit struck a portion of the initiative limiting
contributions to a certain amount in a fiscal year as unconstitutionally
favoring incumbents.' The sponsors of the initiative thereafter
brought an original proceeding in the California Supreme Court. The
court framed the question presented as: "[A]ssuming enforcement of
the challenged sections as enacted would violate the federal Consti-
tution, may, and if so, should, the statutes be judicially reformed in a
manner that avoids the fiscal year measure?"3' 5
The court squarely confronted the argument that such judicial
rewrites would violate separation of powers and concluded that
319. Id.
320. See supra Part V.
321. 11 Cal. 4th 607, 905 P.2d 1248, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (1995).
322. See id. at 660-62, 905 P.2d at 1283-85, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44.
323. See id. at 613, 905 P.2d at 1250, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
324, See id. at 614, 905 P.2d at 1251, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
325. Id. at 614, 905 P.2d at 1251, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
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"[u]nder established decisions of this court and the United States Su-
preme Court, a reviewing court may, in appropriate circumstances,
and consistently with the separation of powers doctrine, reform a
statute to conform to constitutional requirements in lieu of simply
declaring it unconstitutional and unenforceable." 6 The court's deci-
sion is not limited to reformation solely of initiative statutes; never-
theless, it is emblematic of the judiciary's self-adopted role as the fi-
nal champion of the initiative that such a doctrine was announced in
a case where the court was asked to save a key portion of an initiative
measure.
F The Judiciary Is Similarly Reluctant to Overrule the Exercise of the
Legislative Power by the Legislature when the Legislature Is
Exercising Its Constitutional Powers
The closer one gets to an exercise of the political power that
crafted the constitution, the greater the judicial deference. Just as
the judiciary will defer to an exercise of the initiative power when-
ever possible, it will also defer to the exercise of the legislative power
delegated to the legislature over the power of direct legislation when
the constitution-the embodiment of the political power-so de-
mands it.
The California Constitution provides that the people's power of
referendum does not apply to urgency statutes.32 An urgency statute
is one that is "necessary for immediate preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety."32 The urgency statute must contain a
"statement of facts constituting the necessity [of the urgency]. 329
When the legislature exercises its discretion under these constitu-
tional provisions, only in the face of a specific constitutional grant of
authority to the legislature-a grant derived from the constitutional
charter created by the political power-have the courts granted the
legislature leeway at the expense of the people exercising their direct
legislative power. Thus, courts will uphold the enactment of urgency
statutes, enactments which, by their urgency, foreclose the ability of
the people to repeal them by referendum3 "unless it 'appears clearly
326. Id at 615,905 P.2d at 1251,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
327. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
328. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d).
329. Id
330. See Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688, 703, 889 P.2d 557, 565, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
363,371 (1995).
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and affirmatively from the legislature's statement of facts that a pub-
lic necessity does not exist. ''33'
Thus, in our "sliding scale" model, only when the constitution it-
self reverses the normal hierarchy between the people's legislative
powers and the legislature's, will the courts permit an expansive role
of the legislature at the expense of the exercise of the people's legis-
lative power.
G. Summary: The Initiative Power Is Afforded Great Deference
Because It More Closely Resembles the "Political" Power
The constitutional text does not explain exactly why statutes en-
acted by initiative should have greater dignity than statutes enacted
by the legislature. 332 Both enactments are, after all, just statutes. The
answer comes from both philosophy and history.
As discussed earlier, this question is no mere formalism but in-
fuses the posture of every case implicating the exercise of the direct
legislative power. It also reflects a real world possessiveness that
Californians have toward their direct legislation. When an initiative
is stymied or overruled, California citizens express a degree and
quality of anger and frustration that is absent when a statute enacted
by the legislature is similarly voided.333 As expressed by Locke,
"mixing" one's labor with an object evokes feelings of ownership and
entitlement. So, too, do Californians feel a sense of propriety over
their direct legislation. Thus, both in theory and in fact, the exercise
of the initiative power closely resembles a direct effort of self-
governance by the governed.
Moreover, direct legislation is really the only facet of govern-
ment that the people participate in directly, even if it is only an exer-
cise of the legislative power. While the political power referred to in
Article II, Section 1 is the theoretical exercise of self-governance,
that task is in reality accomplished by a convention of representa-
tives, or an analog, not in the first instance by the people directly.
331. Davis v. Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 84 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1938)
(quoting Stockburger v. Jordan, 10 Cal. 2d 636, 642, 76 P.2d 671, 674 (1938)); see
also Allen v. Franchise Tax Bd., 39 Cal. 2d 109, 111-12, 245 P.2d 297, 299 (1952);
Livingston v. Robinson, 10 Cal. 2d 730,739-40,76 P.2d 1192,1196 (1938).
332. But see CAL. CONST. art II, § 10(c) (limiting legislature's ability to amend
initiatives).
333. As a result, it has been proposed that legal challenges to initiatives in fed-
eral court be heard by three-judge district courts, so that a single judge cannot
enjoin the measure. See State Initiative Fairness Act, H.R. 1170 (1997).
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Furthermore, the only instance where courts will enforce meaningful
restrictions on the exercise of the initiative power is where the consti-
tution itself-the purest exercise of the political power-expressly re-
stricts the power, as in emergency situations. But, as seen in Rossi,
even that restriction will favor the exercise of a power the people
have reserved to themselves 34
VI. PRESERVING REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT-THE
"AMENDMENT/REVISION" DICHOTOMY
Many commentators have concluded that initiatives and other
forms of direct democracy violate the Guarantee Clause335 because
direct legislation is inimical to representative, republican govern-
ment.336 There are two problems with that argument. First, long ago
the United States Supreme Court held that Guarantee Clause claims
in general, and challenges to initiative lawmaking in particular, were
nonjusticiable political questions.3" State courts seem to follow that
lead, even though the political question doctrine is an outgrowth of
separation of powers in the federal government and should have no
bearing on the power or responsibility of state courts to adjudicate
Guarantee Clause claims.
The second problem with the argument is that republican gov-
ernment can take many forms. It is by no means clear as a historical
334. The absence of any significant textual qualification of direct legislation
reinforces the proposition that these decisions reflect not a radicalization of the
California courts themselves, but rather the most conservative branch's efforts to
enforce what is itself a radical constitutionally-based direct legislative scheme.
As the California Law Revision Commission has observed, unlike other states,
California's initiative scheme-both statutory and constitutional-(1) does not
provide for legislative-type hearings on initiatives prior to their appearance on
the ballot, but only for informational hearings after their qualification, after it is
too late to make any often needed changes; and (2) since the repeal of Califor-
nia's little-used indirect initiative in 1966, the legislature has not been empow-
ered to enact a substantially same proposal once an initiative qualifies, California
is, according to the Commission, the only state that does not permit such pre-
election amendments to initiatives. The absence of such mechanisms, all of
which would enhance the role of the legislature in direct lawmaking, is yet an-
other reflection of the radicalization of California's direct legislative plan, and an
explanation for the obediently radical jurisprudence just discussed.
335. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ).
336. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 93, 88 P. 270, 279 (1906) (McFarland, J., dis-
senting); Schuman, supra note 25, at 957.
337. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911).
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matter that the clause was meant to prohibit the forms of direct de-
mocracy known at the time of the Federal Constitution's ratifica-
tion-instruction and recall."8 These devices, along with the "town
hall" meetings used in New England states,339 resemble today's initia-
tive process. Nonetheless, initiative lawmaking surely tests the limits
of republicanism and merits the careful analysis that other commen-
tators have provided. It will not be repeated here.
That said, however, the guarantee of republican government has
a close analog within the California Constitution itself. It is the ex-
clusion from the initiative power of the ability to fundamentally
change the form of state government. These changes, such as altering
the distribution of powers, can be accomplished only where "the en-
tire sovereignty of the people is represented in the [constitutional]
convention." Republican virtue is thus preserved by denying ma-
jority factions the means to alter the fundamental character of their
government.3 4'
The state constitution has always specified two modes of change:
"amendment" and "revision." As presently framed, the constitution
provides for its own alteration in three ways: (1) "The Legislature by
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of
each house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the
Constitution .... ;,,42 (2) "The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in
the journal, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring,
may submit at a general election the question whether to call a con-
vention to revise the Constitution .... ;343 and (3) "The electors may
amend the Constitution by initiative. '
338. See supra note 108; see alsoTHoMAs E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 37 (1989).
339. See David V. Callies et al., Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative, Referendum and
the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53, 58 (1991); Pfahler, 150 Cal. at
93, 88 P. at 273 (1906) (equating New England model with local initiatives).
340. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 117,36 P. 424,426 (1894).
341. See also Ernest L. Graves, The Guarantee Clause in California: State
Constitutional Limits on Initiatives Changing the California Constitution, 31 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1305 (1998).
342. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
343. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. The constitution of 1849 stated that a con-
vention could be called to "revise and change [the] entire Constitution." CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. X, § 2 (emphasis added). This notion of entirety might sug-
gest that anything less than a wholesale alteration of the document would consti-
tute a mere amendment. The proposed Iowa Constitution of 1844 similarly re-
ferred to "total revision of the fundamental law." FRAGMENTS OF THE DEBATES
OF THE IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1844 AND 1846, at 234
(Benjamin F. Shambaugh ed., 1900) [hereinafter FRAGMENTS OF THE DEBATES].
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These provisions establish two mechanisms for revision, which
may be proposed by legislature or constitutional convention, 5 and
two mechanisms for amendment, which may be proposed by legisla-
ture or initiative. Because of these different mechanisms, an initia-
tive may not revise the constitution.
A. Original Understanding of the Revision/Amendment Dichotomy
The California Constitution of 1849 was a short document,
roughly equal to the Federal Constitution in length."6 It was mostly
constitutive in character and rights conferring, again similar to the
"great outlines" of the federal charter.47 It contained few provisions
of legislative nature.' This practice changed with the convention of
1878-1879. Probably because of the delegates' desire to rein in the
legislature, they greatly expanded the number of legislative-type
provisions-what the delegates called "constitutional legislation." 9
Thus a constitution with a dual function emerged-foundational and
legislative. This duality was common among state constitutions in the
late nineteenth century."
However, the draft of the constitution that was adopted by Iowa voters in 1846
dropped that qualifier. See id. at 304. Similarly, the California Constitution of
1879 dropped the word "entire." See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. Whether
these were intended as substantive changes is not clear from the historical record.
344. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. In describing the political power that inheres
in the people, the constitution declares that "they have the right to alter or"reform" [their government] when the public good may require [it]." Id. at art.
II, § 1 (art. I, § 2 in CAL. CONST. of 1849). Whether a distinction between "alter"
and "reform" was intended is also unclear from the historical record.
345. California is one of only six states that permit the legislature to propose a
revision. See Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitu-
tions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1473, 1479 (1987). The remainder all require constitutional con-
vention. See id.
346. The U.S. Constitution consists of a short preamble and seven articles, re-
vised to include twenty-seven amendments. The 1849 California Constitution
consisted of a short preamble and twelve articles.
347. This is the term John Marshall used to describe the Federal Constitution
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
348. See Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited:
Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century
West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945, 966 (1994) (describing that a delegate to the 1849
convention stated, it was "'improper to insert legislative enactments in a consti-
tution").
349. See generally id. at 962-68.
350. See id.; see also I JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 443-
44 (3d ed. 1915) ("The framers of these more recent constitutions have in fact
neither cared nor wished to draw a line of distinction between what is proper for
a constitution and what ought to be left to be dealt with by the State legisla-
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The organic or constitutive provisions in the constitution were
those "dealing with the frame of and declaring the general principles
of the republican form of government." '351 These provisions had a
higher dignity than provisions partaking of "direct legislation;" the
latter being merely part of the "law of the state.""35 This distinction
helps explain why the constitution differentiates between revision
and amendment. " The former-purposefully cumbersome to im-
plement-includes those fundamental alterations to the basic charter
of government. This is where Lockean popular sovereignty is most
basically manifested and traditionally expressed by the people as-
sembled in convention. As delegates to the 1878-1879 convention
observed,
the convention work[s] on a different level than the "every-
day operations" of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches. Rather, a convention outranks them all; it is their
creator, and fixes limits to their spheres of action, and
boundaries to their powers. It is occasional, exceptional,
brief, and peculiar; it represents the people in their primary
capacity, and forms the organic, fundamental, and
paramount law of state.3l
If this understanding is correct, and the California Supreme
Court believes that it is, 35 it provides a principled basis for
ture."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CoNsTrrUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 386 (Andrew C. McLaughlin ed., 3d
ed. 1898) ("later State constitutions... contain a great deal of direct legislation
enacted by the people of the State on subjects which in the early constitutions
would not be mentioned.") (quoted in Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Los Ange-
les County, 21 Cal. App. 517, 519, 132 P. 282, 283 (1913)). In contrast, the fram-
ers of the 1849 California Constitution were careful not to load the document
with laws of a statutory nature. See Ooley, supra note 93.
351. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 21 Cal. App. 517,
520, 132 P. 282, 283 (1913).
352. Id. at 519, 132 P. at 283.
353. It was not uncommon for state constitutions adopted in the nineteenth cen-
tury to differentiate between amendment and revision. See, e.g., COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 1; OR. CONST art. XVII.
354. Fritz, supra note 348, at 993.
355. See Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 593, 254 P. 946, 949 (1927) ("We
have a state government with three departments, each to check upon the others,
and it would be subversive of the very foundation purposes of our government to
permit an initiative act of any type to throw out of gear our entire legal mecha-
nism."); Crowley v. Freud, 132 Cal. 440, 443-44, 64 P. 696, 698 (1901) (noting that
changes that are "so revolutionary as to be destructive of a republican form of
government" must be accomplished, if at all, "through a general revision by a
constitutional convention"); Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 117, 36 P. 424, 425-
26 (1894).
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distinguishing revision from amendment. Changes to the spheres of
action of the three branches, and boundaries to their powers consti-
tute revisions, and can only be accomplished by exertions of popular
sovereignty in convention.56 "[C]omprehensive changes to the Con-
stitution require more formality, discussion and deliberation than is
available through the initiative process. ' 31 This is especially true of
open-ended changes-changes without "'limitation or restric-
tion"'35 --such as those that a convention itself might make. In con-
trast, changes to the legislative provisions in the constitution, now
comprising seventy-five percent of the document,359 could be ac-
complished more readily-by amendment."
While the differences between a revision and amendment are
fuzzy up close, at the horizon they can be differentiated in the follow-
ing way: any initiative that would alter California's basic governmen-
tal structure-its essential plan for self-governance-cannot be ac-
complished by the legislative power of the initiative any more than it
could be effectuated by the legislature alone. s Such changes can
356. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 221-30, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284-89, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242-47
(1978).
357. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 350, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 334 (1990) (citing Note, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initia-
tive in Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1216, 1224 (1983)); see also Stanley
Mosk, Raven and Revision, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 4 (1991) (expounding on
his concurrence in Raven, Justice Mosk notes that the constitution itself"precludes the idea that it was the intention of the people, by the provision for
amendments authorized in the first section of this article, to afford the means of
effecting the same result which in the next section has been guarded with so
much care and precision").
358. Fritz, supra note 348, at 993.
359. See Ooley, supra note 93 (citation omitted).
360. California adopted the New York model of differentiating between the
modes of revision and amendment, rather than the Iowa model requiring a con-
stitutional convention for both major and minor changes. Perhaps, the Califor-
nia delegates agreed with a delegate to the convention revising New York's con-
stitution in 1846, arguing for amendments to be proposed by the legislature:
"There should be some mode of giving vent to the prevailing mania for Consti-
tution making." NEW YORK REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 102, at 1038.
361. In McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 333, 196 P.2d 787, 789 (1948), the
court quoted from Livermore: "The legislature is not authorized to assume the
function of a constitutional convention, and propose for adoption by the people a
revision of the entire constitution under the form of an amendment... ." Id.
(quoting Livermore, 102 Cal. at 118,36 P. at 426).
The court then held that the initiative power-being only a legislative
power-is equally insufficient to the task of revising the constitution: "The initia-
tive power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution in 1911 (art.
IV, § 1) applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
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only be instituted by an exercise of "political power" that, both in our
federal charter and here, is either the real world analog to the hypo-
thetical state of political nature-the constitutional convention-or
an exercise of super-legislative power, where both the people and the
legislature act in concert.362 In the former extraordinary settings, no
less than the political power-the basic rights of humankind-are ex-
ercised in the creation of a mechanism of self-governance?. 3 In the
latter, the effect is to replicate, in an ad hoc way, the conventions
where the legislators are the convention delegates, and the people re-
tain their power ultimately to approve or dispose of the proposed re-
vision. 6
Thus, the reason that initiative legislation cannot accomplish a
revision of the California Constitution is that the initiative power is a
mere legislative power, a constituent member of the broader, and
more elemental political power.36 Despite the initiative's facial re-
semblance to the kind of direct act of self-governance that takes
place in a convention, the people exercising their legislative power of
initiative could no more vest judicial powers in the executive than
could the legislature by passing a bill to that effect.3" As between the
amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision." lId
362. The constitution may be revised either by super-majority proposal of the
Legislature or by constitutional convention, followed in each case by electoral ap-
proval. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1,2. Again, observe the similarity between
the California and federal systems. Article V of the Federal Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
say, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the appli-
cation of the legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when rati-
fied by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Rati-
fication may be proposed by the Congress....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
363. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
364. Constitution framers of the mid-nineteenth century apparently felt more
secure with conventions than with legislatures. The Iowa Constitution of 1846
required a constitutional convention both for revisions and amendments. See
IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 10, § 1. The other state constitution with the greatest
influence on the 1849 California Constitution was New York's. Its constitution
of 1846 also distinguished between revision and amendment, the former requir-
ing a convention, the latter not. However, the New York Constitution required
that the calling of a convention be put before the voters every twenty years. See
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. XIII, § 2.
365. See CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 1; see also CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (stating
"[t]he initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to
the Constitution and to adopt or reject them").
366. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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political power and the reserved initiative power, the political power
is greater than the initiative power, insofar as the exercise of the for-
mer may alter or eliminate the latter, while the reverse is not true.
367
B. Implementation of the Revision/Amendment Dichotomy by the
Supreme Court
The California Supreme Court first considered the formal re-
quirements for amending the state constitution in 1894, before the
initiative process was adopted. In Livermore v. Waite, 6s the court
held that the legislature had improperly submitted an amendment to
the people moving the state capital from Sacramento to San Jose. 69
According to the terms of the amendment, the move would not occur
unless the state received certain promised land and money.7 The
court held that the amendment "being conditional in its terms, would
be ineffective in accomplishing a change of the seat of government
from that already fixed by the constitution."3 7' Because the
"amendment would fail to become an operative part of the constitu-
tion," it could not be submitted to the voters for ratification2m
The court's formalism is patent. It held that the constitution
"can be neither revised nor amended except in the manner pre-
scribed by itself, and the power.., must be strictly pursued."3 73 In
dicta the court drew this distinction between the forms of constitu-
tional change:
The very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that
the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original
367. Indeed, in a constitutional convention, arguably, there is no act of self-
governance. There is an act of creating the mechanism by which self-governance
will take place.
368. 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424 (1894).
369. See id. at 122-24, 36 P. at 427-28.
370. See id- at 121-22,36 P. at 427-28.
371. Id. at 122-23, 36 P. at 427.
372. Id at 121, 36 P. at 426-27.
373. Id. at 117, 36 P. at 425-26.
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instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry
out the purpose for which it was framed.74
Livermore concerned an amendment proposed by the Legisla-
ture. A half-century later, in McFadden v. Jordan.' the court held
that the same distinction applied to initiatives. Indeed, since the ini-
tiative process had been "framed and adopted long after the decision
in Livermore[,]" the McFadden court deemed it to have preserved
the Livermore standard76
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative.., now
before us is so broad that if [it] ... became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be effected,
then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention....377
The court then held that the California Bill of Rights on the 1948
ballot, was "revisory rather than amendatory in nature and that as
such it [was] barred from the initiative.""8 The basis for this conclu-
sion was that the amendment, containing 208 sections and more than
21,000 words, and repealing or altering fifteen of twenty-five existing
articles, constituted "extensive alterations in the basic plan and sub-
stance of our present Constitution.""
Significantly, the court reiterated the strict formalism for consti-
tutional change.
The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear
when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a
constitutional convention as a protection against
improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they
understood that there was a real difference between
amendment and revision .... [T]he distinction appears to
374. Id. at 118-19, 36 P. at 426.
375. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
376. Id- at 333-34, 196 P.2d at 789-90.
377. Id. at 334, 196 P.2d at 790.
378. Id. at 332, 196 P.2d at 788.
379. Id. at 347, 196 P.2d at 797. The court's discussion of the revi-
sion/amendment distinction in McFadden resembles the single subject analyses of
later cases. See supra Part V.A. The single subject rule was not employed in
McFadden because it was enacted at the same election as the initiative reviewed
by the court. See Wilson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 678, 695 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 780 (1983). One court has
observed that "[t]he amendment/revision rationale became much less important
after enactment of... the single subject rule." Id.
1225June 1998]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1165
be scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the
amendment [creating the initiative process] that the power
to propose and vote on "amendments to the Constitution"
is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings,
while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure
relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power
[can only be exercised in convention].
Jurisprudence in this area was simplified by the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Amador Valley Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Equalization.381 There the court announced
a two-part analysis, examining both the quantitative and qualitative
effects of an initiative.3 The former would preclude measures, such
as in McFadden, which would make wholesale changes to the consti-
tution. The latter would check initiatives that would effect significant
change in the constitutional scheme. The court stated: "even a rela-
tively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.
•.".,,3" Such a qualitative change could only come about through the
exercise of political power-as in a convention-not by mere initia-
tive power.
Applying this test to the property tax reforms in Proposition 13,
the court noted that the initiative affected a single article of the con-
stitution; hence it was not quantitatively a revision." Next, it exam-
ined the measure's qualitative effects, both on the distribution of
powers between state and local government, and on republican gov-
ernment. 5 It found neither effect substantial or novel; hence, neither
was a revision.'
Amador moved the court significantly away from Livermore and
McFadden. Now the court was ready to uphold fairly dramatic al-
terations in the distribution of powers. Admittedly, the losers were
local governments, rather than a branch of state government. Still,
their ability to tax and control their own revenues was now seriously
curtailed or, worse yet, transferred to the legislature."s  After
380. McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 347-48, 196 P.2d at 798.
381. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
382. See id. at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
383. Id.
384. See id. at 224, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
385. See id. at 224-25, 583 P.2d at 1286-87, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45.
386. See id. at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
387. Not only had Proposition 13 limited property tax rates to one percent of
acquisition value, but it imposed severe restrictions, such as super-majority vot-
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Proposition 13, the legislature began to control municipal treasuries
as it had done prior to the reforms of 187 9 ."' Indeed, enactments in
the wake of Proposition 13389 seem to undo a principal product of the
1878-1879 convention: home rule."9
That the court is more concerned about state powers than mu-
nicipal powers is confirmed by its decision in Raven v. Deukmejian.9
There the court applied Amador's qualitative standard to find that a
single, straightforward change to the constitution was an illegal
ing, on new levies. See id. at 227-35, 583 P.2d at 1288-93, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 246-51.
Yet, the court held that the initiative "neither destroys nor annuls the taxing
power of local agencies." Id. at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245. In
addition to restricting taxes, Proposition 13 seemingly conferred plenary power
on the legislature to "apportion" the taxes collected among local taxing entities.
See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a). This seemed to undercut, if not abrogate
altogether, the home rule powers of cities and counties because they no longer
controlled their own revenues. See id. at art. XI, § 5 (stating that cities may gov-
ern their own affairs); id. at art. XI, § 11(a) and art. XIII, § 24 (municipal tax
authority). The court avoided this potentially serious redistribution of govern-
ment powers, which would have been a constitutional revision, by citing "recent
implementing legislation [of emergency bail-out funding which] confirms the
Legislature's present intention to preserve home rule and local autonomy re-
specting the allocation and expenditure of real property tax revenues." Amador
Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 226, 583 P.2d at 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
Finally, the court rejected the "republican government" argument. "[B]oth
local and state government will continue to function through the traditional sys-
tem of elected representation." Id. at 227, 583 P.2d at 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
Responding specifically to Proposition 13's requirement of two-thirds voter ap-
proval for new taxes, the court found examples of super-majority voting in the
constitution. See id. at 228, 583 P.2d at 1288-89, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47. Thus,
Proposition 13 "adds nothing novel to the existing governmental framework of
this state." Id. at 228, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
388. See County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1457, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (1994) (stating that Proposition 13 "removed whatever doubt
previously may have existed concerning the power of the state to allocate prop-
erty tax revenue"); City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Mackzum, 228 Cal. App. 3d
929, 945, 279 Cal. Rptr. 220, 228 (1991) (Proposition 13 altered "the preexisting
taxing power of charter cities" by giving authority to the legislature to re-
apportion municipal property taxes.).
389. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 97.01, 97.03 (West 1998)
(appropriating municipal tax revenues to pay for state education funding obliga-
tions) (repealed and replaced by CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 97, 97.2 (West
1998)).
390. See Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 399,579 P.2d 449, 456, 146
Cal. Rptr. 558, 565 (1978) (stating that home rule "grants to chartered cities the
authority to manage local affairs; and ... imposes a corresponding restriction
upon the power of the state Legislature to interfere with or override decisions on
municipal matters made at the local level") (Richardson, J., concurring); see gen-
erally John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: Part I, 30 CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1941) (discussing the origin of home rule in the 1879 constitution).
391. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077,276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
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revision? 2 Article I, Section 24 stated simply that "[r]ights guaran-
teed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by
the United States Constitution."'3 3 One of the sections in the "Crime
Victims' Justice Reform Act," Proposition 115, on the June 1990
ballot, qualified Article I, Section 24 by stating that certain criminal
procedure rights in the state constitution "shall be construed by the
courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the
United States.
3
4
The court found that this "restriction on the independent judicial
interpretation of . . . state constitutional rights, 39 5 amounted to
"vest[ing] all judicial interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal
defense rights, in the United States Supreme Court. From a qualita-
tive standpoint, the effect of Proposition 115 is devastating. 33 Be-
cause the challenged provision enacted "such a far-reaching change
in our governmental framework as to amount to a qualitative consti-
tutional revision, [it was] beyond the reach of the initiative proc-
ess." 397
The court has not always been so jealous of its independent in-
terpretive powers. For instance, in Crawford v. Board of Educa-
tion,391 the court declined to hear a challenge to Proposition 1,
amending the state Equal Protection Clause, Article I, Section 7.
392. See id. at 351-52, 801 P.2d at 1087,276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
393. Id. at 350, 801 P.2d at 1086,276 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
394. Id. The challenged section read in full:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the
laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally
present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and not to suffer the imposition
of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this
state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater
rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of
the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to
minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those aorded
by the Constitution of the United States.
Id.
395. Id. at 351, 801 P.2d at 1086, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
396. Id. at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
397. Id at 341, 801 P.2d at 1080, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The court rejected a
"single subject" challenge, noting that although the initiative affected numerous
changes to criminal procedures, they were all "reasonably germane" to the com-
mon theme of criminal justice reform. Id. at 346-48, 801 P.2d at 1083-85, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 332-34.
398. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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That initiative forbade school busing "unless a federal court would
[order busing] to remedy [a] violation of the... [United States] Con-
stitution."3 9 Perhaps isolated, single-right restrictions on the judicial
power do not equal a revision, but similar restrictions in a broad area
of judicial authority do.m
But, the court is not consistent on this score. For instance, in
People v. Superior Court (Romero),41 it went through contortions to
find that the "three-strikes" law allowed judges to strike prior con-
victions on their own motion, despite clear language, both in an ini-
tiative, Proposition 184, and a similar statute, that only the prosecu-
tor could do so. The court's novel construction was necessary, lest
the laws' transfer of judicial power to the prosecution violate separa-
tion of powers.'
Despite a score of efforts, the court's revision/amendment juris-
prudence remains imprecise. Yet, we have the basic framework in
hand and can now apply it to the most far-reaching constitutional re-
vision of all-the initiative process itself.
C. Was The Initiative Process Adopted Through Constitutional
Means?
The underlying assumption of this Article is that the 1911 consti-
tutional amendment reserving to the people the power of initiative
and referendum was itself constitutional. Much proceeds from that
399. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 527. The court may not have been presented with a
revision challenge, so that its declination to hear the case may not shed any light
on the issue. The Court of Appeal upheld Proposition 1 as a validly enacted ini-
tiative, but it is not clear whether a revision challenge was presented in the Peti-
tion for Hearing. See Crawford, 113 Cal. App. 3d at 652 n.5, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
507-08 n.5.
Article I, Section 7 was also upheld by the United States Supreme Court
against an Equal Protection challenge. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545.
400. The court in Raven employed this distinction to explain its prior decisions
in In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 891-92, 694 P.2d 744,755-56,210 Cal. Rptr. 631,
642-43 (1985) (upholding a provision limiting the state exclusionary remedy for
search and seizure violations of fourth amendment standards), and People v. Fri-
erson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 186-87, 599 P.2d 587, 613-14, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 307 (1979)
(upholding a provision allowing California courts to impose the dealth penalty in
capital cases to the full extent allowed under the Eighth Amendment). See Ra-
ven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
401. 13 Cal. 4th 497,917 P.2d 628,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
402. See id. at 513-17, 917 P.2d at 636, 153 Cal. Rtr. at 797.
403. See id. at 531-32, 917 P.2d at 809-10, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49; see also
People v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 928 P.2d 1171, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93
(1997) (stating that notwithstanding intent of three strikes law, courts have power
to reduce "wobbler" defenses from felonies to misdemeanors).
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assumption, including the entire jurisprudence developed by the state
supreme court on initiatives. But what if the initiative process was
adopted through unconstitutional means?
Many commentators have concluded that initiatives and other
forms of direct democracy violate the Guarantee Clause,4 although
the claim appears to be a nonjusticiable political question. 45 Whether
the initiative process is "republican in form" or not, it surely is a sig-
nificant departure from the standard tripartite model of government,
where all legislative enactments must pass through the filter of repre-
sentative legislatures. Since the initiative process fundamentally af-
fects the processes and form of government, when enacted in 1911 it
arguably represented a revision of the pre-existing constitutional
structure, not merely an amendment to it.
The California Constitution of 1879, applicable in 1911, did not
permit the legislature to put constitutional revisions before the peo-
ple. ' Rather, the people first had to approve a call for a constitu-
tional convention.4w Only that body had the power to propose revi-
sions for adoption by the people. This process, requiring two votes of
the people and their collective deliberation in convention,' was pur-
posefully cumbersome. Fundamental structural changes to the mode
of government were not to be made casually.4
Efforts to expedite constitutional change are ill advised and
threaten such constitutional values as popular sovereignty,
political stability, and minority rights .... [T]he outcome of
a single election is less likely to provide a meaningful
expression of the will of the people than the outcome of the
complex textual procedures.4 0
404. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ).
405. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
406. Proposition 7, approved in November 1962, authorized the legislature to
submit constitutional revisions to the people in the same manner as constitu-
tional amendments. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
407. CAL CONST. of 1879 art. XVIII, § 1 (repealed Nov. 3, 1970).
408. See id.
409. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy
of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUm. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 286 n.157
(1996) ("[I]f an amendment changes the procedurally democratic character of the
constitution [it should] rise to the more difficult branch of the two-tiered
amending method.").
410. Colantuono, supra note 345, at 1500-01.
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Nor could the legislature deviate from the prescribed routes to
constitutional change and simply put the issue directly before the
people. As the court stated in Livermore:
[t]he power of the legislature to initiate any change in the
existing organic law... being a delegated power, is to be
strictly construed under the limitations by which it has been
conferred. In submitting propositions for the amendment of
the constitution, the legislature is not in the exercise of its
legislative power, or of any sovereignty of the people that
has been entrusted to it, but is merely acting under a limited
power conferred upon it by the people.... The extent of
this power is limited to the object for which it is given, and
is measured by the terms in which it has been conferred, and
cannot be extended by the legislature to any other object, or
enlarged beyond these terms. The legislature is not
authorized to assume the function of a constitutional
convention, and propose for adoption by the people a
revision of the entire constitution under the form of an
amendment.... 41'
To test the proposition that enactment of the initiative process
may have constituted a revision, it is useful to compare the pre-
existing text with the language adopted by Senate Constitutional
Amendment 22 at the special election of October 10, 1911.42 As well,
it is instructive to examine the ballot materials submitted to the vot-
ers.
Article IV, Section 1 of the California Constitution of 1879 pro-
vided for legislative powers as follows:
411. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 117-18,36 P. 424, 426 (1894). Decisions
from other states have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Rivera-Cruz v.
Gray, 104 So. 2d 501, 502-04 (Fla. 1958) (stating that amendment of the constitu-
tion may be effected by legislative action and approved by a vote of the people,
while revision of the constitution requires a convention. The legislature may not
effect a revision, without convention, by means of wholesale amendment.); El-
lingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (Ind. 1912), cert. dismissed, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (stating
"[t]he proposal of amendments to the Constitution is not a power inherent in the
legislative department, but must be conferred by a special grant of the Constitu-
tion; and in the absence of such a provision, the legislature has no capacity thus
to initiate amendments").
412. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (repealed Nov. 8, 1966). Senate Constitutional
Amendment 22 passed by a vote of 35 to 1 in the Senate and 72 to 0 in the As-
sembly. It was approved by the voters with a vote of 168,744 to 52,093. See
Ooley, supra note 93.
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The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a
Senate and Assembly, which shall be designated The
Legislature of the State of California, and the enacting
clause of every law shall be as follows: "The people of the
State of California; represented in Senate and Assembly, do
enact as follows:"4t
As amended, Article IV, Section 1 read:
The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a senate
and assembly, which shall be designated "The legislature of
the State of California," but the people reserve to
themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to
the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same, at the polls
independent of the legislature, and also reserve the power,
at their own option, to so adopt or reject any act, or section
or part of any act, passed by the legislature." The enacting
clause of every law shall be as follows: "The People of the
State of California do enact as follows:
414
First observe that the "People of the State of California" are no
longer "represented in senate and assembly" when they enact legis-
lation; they act directly. Is this a repudiation of republicanism or
fulfillment of democratic ideals? Partisans for and against the meas-
ure took different views. Proponents claimed:
These amendments are not opposed to our form of
government, not opposed to the ideals of the fathers of the
republic, and are not contrary to the spirit of our
institutions. Exactly the opposite is true.4 5
In contrast, opponents claimed:
The "proposed initiative and referendum" amendment.., is
so radical as to be almost revolutionary in its character. Its
tendency is to change the republican form of our
government and head it towards democracy, and history
teaches that democracies have universally ended in
turbulence and disaster.416
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. 1911 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 165 (statement of
Senator Lee Gates and Assemblyman William Clark in favor of Constitutional
Amendment No. 22).
416. Id. (Statement of Senator Leroy Wright against Senate Constitutional
Amendment No. 22).
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Whether or not the measure was anti-republican, it surely
changed the character of state government. The power conferred to
act "independent[ly] of the legislature" and to "adopt or reject" any
legislative act, endowed the people as a super-legislature. 7 Indeed,
the argument in favor of Amendment 22 claimed it would give
"people power to control legislation of the state [and] the power to
pass judgment upon the acts of the legislature., 418 This alone seems
to denote a significant alteration in government structure. In analysis
one may "[a]sk whether the measure, on its face, reallocates or di-
minishes authority delegated to a constituent branch of state or local
government by the existing constitution. If the answer is yes, no fur-
ther inquiry is necessary. The measure proposes a revision and is not
properly subject to initiative. 4 9
Next, one should consider the very term used to confer the ini-
tiative power-"reserve." The term itself suggests a new organic act
of constituting government, rather than a mere reclamation of a
power previously delegated.4" It is a term one would expect to
emerge from a constitutional convention, not one simply adding a
mechanism for enacting laws. The people could reserve a power oth-
erwise delegated only through their exercise of political power-by
meeting in convention. Unless the 1879 convention had done so, the
1911 electorate would have needed to meet anew in convention.
Perhaps the use of the term "reserve" was merely declaratory of
the existing state of things, such that no instrumental or transforma-
tive significance should be ascribed to the term. Compare, for ex-
ample, the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It too re-
serves powers; in that case, "to the states respectively, or to the
people."42' Yet, the Tenth Amendment truly is declaratory of the
original plan of the Constitution. It was added in order to "prevent
misconstruction or abuse" of the Constitution, not to create new
rights or limitations.4' In contrast, the 1911 amendment reserving the
417. Id.
418. Id (Statement of Senator Lee Gates and Assemblyman William Clark in
favor of Senate Constititutional Amendment No. 22).
419. Susan Johnson, Measure for Measure: Amendment and Revision of the
Oregon Constitution, 74 OR. L. REv. 1065, 1084 (1995).
420. See Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591,557 P.2d
473,477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41,46 (1976).
421. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
422. See Resolution Transmitting the Proposed Bill of Rights to the States,
Sept. 24, 1789, in II BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
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initiative power to the people of California was new, not merely a re-
statement of relative powers defined by the 1879 convention.
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the people can
reserve only those powers they possessed at the time of ratification.4n
Thus, if Californians possessed the initiative power as of 1879, such
that it was merely recognized as reserved a generation later, then the
convention's efforts to strictly proscribe the mechanism for constitu-
tional change were idle and meaningless gestures.
The state supreme court has rejected the notion that the people
emerged from the 1879 convention possessed of the inherent right to
initiate constitutional change by popular vote. In McFadden v. Jor-
dan4 the court held that the voters had no "power to initiate directly
a revision of... the Constitution."4u Instead, the constitution limited
the people's right to affect change; "a wholly new and constitutionally
unauthorized procedure for revision" could not occur. 26 The holding
in McFadden is incompatible with the notion that the people had, by
the 1879 constitution, reserved any inherent power to revise the
document. It could be done only by prescribed means.
The upshot is that the 1911 amendment establishing the initiative
process seems to have changed the pre-existing relationship between
the people and their government. It did so in profound ways, perhaps
not anticipated in 1911, but obvious now. This change came about
not through the exercise of the people's inherent political power-the
popular sovereignty that is exercised in convention-but on the pre-
tense that it was a mere amendment.
It should be remembered that popular distrust of the legislature
was at least as great in 1879 as it was in 1911. "Most delegates [to the
1878 convention] regarded the legislature as a necessary evil," but the
only remedy considered at that time was limiting its sphere of action
"to prevent it from doing too much damage.""
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1163-65 (1971). The Resolution stated that the twelve
proposed amendments contained "declaratory and restrictive clauses." Id. Yet,
of the twelve, only the last, which became the Tenth Amendment, is written in
precatory language; it is the only one not containing the word "shall." The Su-
preme Court has also confirmed the declaratory nature of the Tenth Amend-
ment. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that the
Tenth Amendment "states but a truism").
423. United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995).
424. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
425. Id. at 350, 196 P.2d at 799.
426. Id.
427. SWISHER, supra note 114, at 96.
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Despite the manifest distrust of the legislature, the 1879 consti-
tution made no provision for initiatives. It entrusted the entire law-
making process to the legislature, albeit within detailed limits. No
pretense was made that such a power could be exercised directly by
the people. Such a power would have been considered too radical at
the time, perhaps even "communist." 42 The document was far more
modest in its reforms, particularly as related to the exercise of power.
The new constitution would have been "'simply impossible of execu-
tion... if, in terms, it sought to repeal all law and leave everything to
the right of the strongest.' 42 Instead, as Henry George observed, the
constitution "imposes barriers to future radicalism by a provision in
regard to amendments which will require almost a revolution to
break through."4 °
In sum, the 1879 constitution never envisioned the initiative
process, or anything remotely like it. And because the device
adopted in 1911 did not lay "within the lines of the original instru-
ment," 431 as constitutional "amendments" must, it seems to have been
a revision. As such, the initiative process was likely improperly
adopted.
So what! Given the ethereal ill-understood nature of how
popular sovereigns gain widespread legitimacy, is not the foregoing
analysis mere formalism? Even if, through the 20/20 hindsight of the
court's revision/amendment jurisprudence, the people acted extra-
legally in 1911 by wrongly adopting the initiative process through an
amendment, is there not a point at which it becomes legitimate
through acceptance, history, and usage? A similar point was made by
Madison, arguing that the purported illegitimacy of the 1787 Phila-
delphia convention was irrelevant because adoption of the constitu-
tion would "'blot out all antecedent errors and irregularities."'432 Fi-
nally, what underlying principles of popular sovereignty and
republicanism are furthered by recognizing the initiative power only
through convention, rather than by popular adoption as an amend-
ment?
428. Charges, including some in leading newspapers, that the convention was a
communist plot arose even before the delegates were elected. See id.at 24. The
polemic against populist reforms continued during the convention, and after the
constitution was reported out, as a means of arguing for its defeat. See id.at 110-
11.
429. Id at 110 (citation omitted).
430. Id-
431. Darby, 312 U.S. at 120-21.
432. FRAGMENTS OF THE DEBATES, supra note 343, at 310-11.
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Answering these questions requires a policy-oriented assessment
of the role that initiatives have come to play in California's govern-
ance and, perhaps more importantly, of the California Supreme
Court's role as the vigorous protector of the initiative. That body is
the keeper of the constitutional faith. Yet, "[o]ver the years to an
almost universal extent, initiatives have been judicially untouch-
able. 4 33 The court's reluctance to enforce limits on the initiative
process suggests an acceptance of the existing regime, whether at-
tained in a technically permitted fashion or not. The court, after all,
is itself directly accountable to the people, not just in the exercise of
their political power in "altering or reforming" government, but also
pursuant to their electoral power. In the final analysis, that may be
all that matters.
VII. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, Californians have with varying degrees of
enthusiasm embraced their ability to legislate directly, even while
commentators lament the obvious shortcomings of the process as a
reasoned instrument of social policy. A comprehensive review of the
initiative power's4 structure reinforces just how radical an instru-
ment it is in California, and, ironically, reveals how faithful the most
conservative branch-the judiciary-has been in defending it. In-
deed, so radical is the power that its very nature casts doubts as to
whether it was lawfully enacted.
Those complaints about the initiative process are louder now
than in recent years, from all sides. Perhaps the most penetrating
critique comes from those who argue that, given the expense of
placing an initiative on the ballot and winning the campaign, initia-
tives have become largely a tool of the very special interests that
were the original targets of the initiative power.
In any event, it is apparent that the jurisprudence, political the-
ory, and history underlying the initiative's frequent use in California
translate into a very palpable and stubborn sense among Californians
that this is "their" right, no matter what its flaws. This is repeatedly
seen in the cases that extol the connection between initiatives and our
most popularly sacred-if inaccurate-civil precept: democracy. It is
433. Mosk, supra note 357, at 1.
434. During the last few decades, most of the issues placed on the ballot pro-
moted particular interests, and often involved a battle between opposing inter-
ests.
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hard to know which was the chicken and which was the egg-the
court's deference to the power or the people's insistence upon such
deference-although Locke would doubtless point to such a sense of
ownership as empirical evidence of his precepts. Indeed, one won-
ders at this point whether Californians would ever accept a govern-
ment as legitimate if it did not provide for some form of direct de-
mocracy.
Whatever opinion one may hold about this much used and much
maligned instrument, Californians and their legal institutions have
been radicalized by the "people's" power in our state to such an ex-
treme degree that any political or legal effort toward reform must
take that into account, not just as a jurisprudential matter, but as a
practical matter as well. As one political analyst noted, "America's
most populous state seems to have given up on representative gov-
ernment." 435
435. Nicholas Lemann, The New York Times Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1998, at 7 (reviewing PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST, CALIFORNIA'S
EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FuTuRE).
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